Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front, 1941-1942: Schwerpunkt

The heavily-reinforced 20th Army massed fifty-three artillery regiments to try and blast a hole through von Arnim’s defenses, but fog and snow greatly reduced the accuracy of the initial Soviet artillery preparation (another example of Zhukov’s inadequate planning; Operation Uranus also began in fog/snow conditions, but Vatutin ensured that his artillerymen pre-registered their guns), so the three rifle divisions that began the ground assault were repulsed with 50 per cent losses. Zhukov ignored these losses and told Konev to keep attacking in the same sector, which suited Model fine. Model relied upon his artillery to break up the massed Soviet infantry assaults, which then allowed his panzerjägers to pick off unsupported T-34s and KV-1s.

Stützpunkt Grediakino, held by Major Kurt Stieber’s II/Pz.Gren. 14 from 5.Panzer-Division, proved to be an immovable roadblock for the 20th Army. Oberleutnant Hans-Siegfried Rothkirch’s 2./Pz.Regt 31, equipped with a mixed group of seven tanks (one Pz.IIIN with short 7.5cm, two Pz.III with short 5cm, three Pz.III with long 5cm and one Pz.IV with short 7.5cm) and two Marder tank destroyers moved into Grediakino to support the defense. The constant Soviet artillery bombardments forced Rothkirch’s panzers to remain in dead space most of the time, but they were still damaged repeatedly by near-misses and the panzer crews were forced to remain inside their vehicles for several days without resupply of food, fuel or ammunition. Nevertheless, every time Soviet armour from the 25th and 93rd Tank Brigades attacked the strongpoint, Rothkirch’s panzers emerged and picked off enough enemy tanks to drive off the assault. The 42nd Guards Rifle Division managed to encircle Stützpunkt Grediakino, but the Luftwaffe provided aerial resupply drops and a lone Pz.II fought through Soviet lines with a load of Panzergranate APC ammunition. Over the course of seven days, Rothkirch’s company knocked out sixteen Soviet tanks (eight T-34, two KV-1, two T-60, one Lee and three BT) at a cost of two tanks and one Marder II lost. All the German tanks were repeatedly damaged by hits from artillery and PTRD anti-tank rifle fire, but remained in action.

Finally, Model recognized that Kampfgruppe Stieber was running out of defenders and organized a breakout, which succeeded at 0300 hours on 1 December. Rothkirch’s 2./Pz.Regt 31 made it back to German lines.⁸⁸

Konev’s infantry finally made a small tear in von Arnim’s front south of Grediakino and Zhukov prodded Konev to commit General-major Andrei L. Getman’s 6th Tank Corps and 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps into the breach as a mobile group. Although Konev’s mobile group managed to advance west 12km and caused a crisis for the Germans, it soon found itself in a long, thin salient. As usual, the Luftwaffe appeared and pounded Konev’s tightly-packed mobile group mercilessly. Von Arnim conducted a masterful elastic defense until he was able to maneuver the 5 and 9.Panzer-Division against Konev’s salient, but an initial counterattack by Kampfgruppe Hochbaum from 9.Panzer-Division at Aristovo on 27 November failed; eighteen tanks from the 6th Tank Corps were knocked out, but Panzer-Regiment 33 lost eight tanks knocked out.⁸⁹ On 29 November, von Arnim was finally able to orchestrate a counterattack the cut off Konev’s mobile group, and gradually annihilated it by 4 December.

On the western side of the salient, Purkaev’s Kalinin Front attacked Harpe’s XXXXI Panzerkorps at two places with the 22nd and 41st Armies. The 41st Army achieved a major breakthrough south of Belyi by overrunning the 2.Luftwaffen-Feld-Division, then it pushed General-major Mikhail D. Solomatin’s 1st Mechanized Corps, and 6th Rifle Corps into the breach; these forces advanced 35km eastward before being stopped by Generalleutnant Walter Krüger’s 1.Panzer-Division’s Kampfgruppe von Meden (one Panzer-Abteilung and three motorized infantry battalions) at the Nacha River. Solomatin started the offensive with 215 tanks, but he quickly fragmented his corps by committing one brigade against Belyi, which was held by the rest of Krüger’s 1.Panzer-Division, three brigades against von Meden and his reserve brigade in a flanking maneuver.

Consequently, Solomatin squandered his breakthrough by failing to mass at a single point, as the German schwerpunkt did. Solomatin’s mechanized units eventually got across the Nacha River and began to split Kampfgruppe von Meden into two pieces, but Oberst Karl-Friedrich von der Meden was able to delay Solomatin from finishing off his beleaguered kampfgruppe – which was down to its last two operational Pz.III tanks – until the lead elements of 12.Panzer-Division arrived to reinforce him on 1 December.