Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front, 1941-1942: Schwerpunkt

Badanov’s tankers also encountered a serious roadblock at the bridge over the Bystraya at Skosyrskaya at 1700 hours on 23 December. Kampfgruppe Heinemann, composed of 200 Luftwaffe signal troops and six 8.8cm flak guns, engaged Polkovnik Stepan K. Nesterov’s 130th Tank Brigade as it crossed the bridge. Nesterov’s tankers managed to overrun five of the 8.8cm flak guns and chase the Germans out of the town, but many vehicles were damaged and fuel stocks were low. Badanov made the bold decision to proceed to Tatsinskaya with two tank brigades, but leave the rest of his corps in Skosyrskaya. At dawn on 24 December, about sixty tanks from Badanov’s corps approached Tatsinskaya airfield, which was shrouded in fog. The Luftwaffe had not organized a ground defense of this vital airbase, which had 170 transport planes and warehouses full of supplies destined for Stalingrad – the Germans were caught totally by surprise. The 54th and 130th Tank Brigades executed a concentric attack on the airfield which caused a panic; the Ju-52s began a chaotic mass take-off that managed to save 124 transports, but Badanov’s raid destroyed forty-six transports. The loss of Tatsinskaya was catastrophic for AOK 6 in Stalingrad since it brought the airlift to a virtual halt. Badanov reported to Vatutin that he had captured Tatsinskaya and still had fifty-eight tanks (thirty-nine T-34 and nineteen T-70) left, but only 0.2 loads of diesel fuel and twenty-four–forty rounds of 76.2mm ammunition for each T-34.⁹⁷

The capture of Tatsinskaya caused a convulsion within Heeresgruppe Don. Von Manstein hastily directed both Raus’ 6.Panzer-Division and Balck’s 11.Panzer-Division to move west and crush the Soviet armoured raiders. The lead element of 11.Panzer-Division bumped into Badanov’s 130th Tank Brigade at Babovnya, east of Tatsinskaya; seven Soviet and five German tanks were knocked out in the skirmish. A Ukrainian tank officer was captured, who under interrogation revealed the size and disposition of Badanov’s forces at Tatsinskaya.⁹⁸ Both German panzer divisions converged on Tatsinskaya, encircling Badanov’s fuel-starved corps. Badanov requested support from Vatutin, who told him to hold on, help was on the way. The Germans tightened the noose around Badanov on 26 December with armoured probing attacks, while Stukas pounded the immobilized Soviets. By 27 December, Badanov was surrounded by both 6 and 11.Panzer-Divisionen and it was obvious that a final assault was imminent. At 0200 hours on 28 December, Badanov conducted an unauthorized breakout with eleven tanks, thirty trucks and 927 of his men and was able to slip through the 6.Panzer-Division’s lines and reach the area held by the 1st Guards Army. The two raids had succeeded in disrupting the Stalingrad airlift for a few days and inflicting significant losses upon the Luftwaffe’s transport fleet, but at the cost of the 24th and 25th Tank Corps suffering crippling losses.

Vatutin called off Little Saturn on 30 December. He had succeeded in shattering the Italian 8th Army and forced Armee-Abteilung Hollidt to abandon the Chir River line, but failed to reach Rostov or cause a complete German collapse. All of the Soviet armoured units involved in the operation were in poor shape due to heavy losses and only had 10–20 per cent of their armour still operational after two weeks of Deep Battle operations.⁹⁹ Heeresgruppe Don had survived – but barely – and mostly due to inadequate Soviet logistics.

Armour on the Eastern Front at the End of 1942

During 1942, the Red Army lost over 15,000 tanks, including 1,200 KV-1, 6,600 T-34s and 7,200 T-60/70s.¹⁰⁰ About half of the 10,500 Lend-Lease tanks (3,000 British, 7,500 USA) delivered in 1942 were also lost.¹⁰¹ Soviet industry built 24,231 tanks in 1942, including 12,535 T-34s and 2,426 KV-1s. Overall Soviet armour losses in 1942 were 62 per cent of those tanks built – which was less than the German build: loss rate and indicated that the Red Army could absorb huge losses in material. However, the overall 7–1 exchange ratio between Soviet and German tank losses was inconsistent with the Red Army gaining any kind of superiority over the Wehrmacht’s panzer forces. At these loss rates, the Red Army was still far more dependent upon Lend-Lease armour than it was willing to admit, and it did not have enough excess production to fully outfit its best units with T-34s until mid-1943.