Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front, 1941-1942: Schwerpunkt

After the failure of Studnev’s counterattack, the Soviet 3rd Army commander decided to abandon the city of Grodno (which had a pre-war population of 50,000), including its fuel depot. When Marshal Semyon K. Timoshenko, the People’s Commissar for Defense and de facto commander-in-chief of the Red Army, learned of the loss of Grodno, he believed that Hoth’s armour was responsible. Timoshenko immediately telexed an order to Pavlov at 2115 hours, directing him to send the 6th Mechanized Corps to eliminate the German forces threatening Grodno. Three hours later, Pavlov obediently issued the orders to Khatskilevich’s Corps and sent his deputy, General-major Ivan S. Boldin, to coordinate the counteroffensive. At this point, Pavlov believed that the 13th Mechanized Corps supporting the 10th Army would be able to stabilize the situation south of Bialystok, where the German 4.Armee had crossed the border in force on Guderian’s left.

Khatskilevich’s 6th Mechanized Corps began moving from its deployment areas around Bialystok before dawn on 23 June. When the sun rose, German reconnaissance aircraft quickly detected the mass of Soviet armour moving toward Grodno and Fliegerkorps VIII delivered a series of punishing attacks on the packed columns; the 7th Tank Division lost sixty-three tanks to air attack. After a 90km road march, the combat elements of Khatskilevich’s corps reached their assembly areas southwest of Grodno around 1400 hours, but since most of the KV tanks only had a quarter-load of fuel remaining, Boldin decided to postpone attack until the next morning. However, the Luftwaffe had destroyed the fuel depot in Bialystok and the nearest alternate fuel supply was in Volkovysk, 75km away. There was actually plenty of petrol for the T-26 and BT light tanks, but diesel was in short supply. On paper, Khatskilevich had one of the most powerful armoured groups in the Red Army, with over 100 KV and 200 T-34 tanks, but the shortage of diesel fuel greatly reduced their combat potential.

Boldin intended to attack with the 6th Mechanized Corps into the flank of the German XX Armeekorps at 1000 hours on 24 June. Due to lack of radios, Boldin was unable to coordinate with the 11th Mechanized Corps, which also intended to counterattack again on 24 June. Boldin had a very inaccurate picture of the enemy situation, which led to faulty deployments for the 6th Mechanized Corps. When Khatskilevich’s tanks began advancing the next morning, they found that the enemy was still nearly 30km away and the long approach march gave the German XX Armeekorps plenty of time to establish an anti-tank defense with the II/Flak 4, equipped with twelve 8.8cm flak guns. Fliegerkorps VIII returned and the Stukas caused considerable damage with accurate dive-bombing. Still awaiting resupply of diesel fuel, Khatskilevich committed only his petrol-fueled BT and T-26 light tanks, which the 8.8cm flak guns of II/Flak 4 shot to pieces at ranges up to 800 meters; between twenty and forty Soviet tanks were lost.¹² Khatskilevich decided to break off his attack, apparently deciding to wait for his heavy tanks, infantry and artillery support to move up, rather than to conduct an attack with just unsupported light tanks.

Pavlov had also promised air support, so Khatskilevich could expect better results if he waited. Likewise, the 11th Mechanized Corps continued to attack the 8.Jäger-Division on 24 June, but lost most of its remaining tanks. However, Khatskilevich’s premature attack had alerted the Germans that a major Soviet armoured counterattack was forthcoming and the 256.Infanterie-Division had time to establish a robust anti-armour defense around the town of Kuznica, strengthened by a battery of 8.8cm flak guns, and two batteries of StuG III assault guns from Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 210.¹³

On 25 June, Khatskilevich continued his attack with 150–200 tanks, but his artillery and air support failed to materialize. As before, the Soviet armour attacked in successive waves, with BA-10 and BA-20 armoured cars in the first wave as reconnaissance, followed by a second wave of T-26 and BT light tanks, to engage enemy positions. The T-34 and KV tanks appeared in the final third wave. When Khatskilevich’s armour struck the 256.Infanterie-Division, the gunners in Panzerjäger-Abteilung 256 quickly found that their 3.7cm and 5cm anti-tank guns could not defeat the Soviet tanks at normal ranges of 500–600 meters. For a moment, the Germans were seized with panic at the sight of Soviet heavy tanks and it seemed that the Red Army might actually achieve a local victory. The second battery of StuG III assault guns from Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 210 was dispatched to deal with the Soviet armour, but their short-barreled 7.5cm howitzers were equally ineffective. Horst Slesina, a German war correspondent, witnessed the combat against the KV and T-34 tanks near Grodno: