Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front, 1941-1942: Schwerpunkt

Operation Barbarossa consisted of offensive ‘pulses’, dictated by the ability of the panzer divisions to attack for a week or two, gain some ground, encircle some Soviet formations, then wait for resupply and their own infantry to catch up. Although it has become fashionable for some modern writers to insist that Barbarossa had clearly failed by either July or August because the Red Army was still undefeated, that is not how either side saw it at any point before the winter of 1941–42. As every professional soldier knows, no plan survives contact with the enemy and even Hitler and the OKH recognized that a quick, cheap victory over Russia was not in the cards after mid-July. However, Hitler believed that the Wehrmacht was accomplishing his intended objective – smashing the Red Army – even if not according to schedule. Throughout the summer and autumn of 1941, German forces held the strategic and operational initiative, with the Soviets only managing to mount counterattacks in between German offensive pulses.

The four German Panzergruppen suffered about 10,000 casualties and lost 106 tanks (including thirty-three Pz.38(t), forty-four Pz.III and fifteen Pz.IV) ‘totalausfall’ in the first eight days of the invasion, but given the scale of destruction they were inflicting on the Red Army, these losses did not seem excessive. About another 200 tanks were damaged or down for repairs, meaning that most panzer divisions still had 100 or more operational tanks in early July. While it is true that operational tank strength in some divisions dropped as low as 30–35 per cent during the summer, the strength of most panzer divisions hovered at around 80–100 operational tanks until cold weather arrived. In contrast, Soviet armour was rapidly disappearing from all but critical sectors on the battlefield.

The first week in Russia revealed that German operational-level efficiency was far more at risk from logistical inadequacies than combat losses. German units quickly discovered that the poor condition of Russian roads greatly increased fuel consumption; one V.S. of fuel would suffice for only 70km of movement instead of 100km. Losses of trucks in panzer units due to a combination of enemy action, accidents and inadequate maintenance quickly resulted in heavy losses of supply vehicles, which put even greater strain on division and corps-level logistics. The Wehrmacht was still essentially tied to the railheads for long-haul, bulk logistic shipments such as fuel (9,000 tons per day), ammunition and spare parts, but the Eisenbahntruppen could only repair and regauge the Soviet broad-gauge tracks at a slow rate.³⁰ Even once repaired, the railroads were only delivering half of the army’s supply needs and fuel and ammunition were in short supply throughout most of the summer fighting. As the Panzergruppen advanced eastward, they quickly moved far beyond practical resupply range and were often forced to call upon the Luftwaffe for emergency resupply. Yet while aerial resupply could suffice in an emergency, it could never really take the place of ground resupply columns. Typically, a single Ju-52 could carry just 1,600 liters of fuel, sufficient to refuel a platoon of five Pz.III tanks. In order to refuel an armoured kampfgruppe, the Luftwaffe would have to conduct about twenty-five Ju-52 sorties, and that does not include additional sorties required for food, ammunition and other supplies. Unless the Wehrmacht could improve its logistic capabilities – which was doubtful – the Panzergruppen would become increasingly depleted as they advanced further eastward.

Stopping Höpner’s Advance on Leningrad, July–September 1941

Once Höpner got across the Dvina River in strength with Reinhardt’s XXXXI Armeekorps (mot.) and von Manstein’s LVI Armeekorps (mot.), there was nothing that the retreating Northwest Front could do to prevent the German panzers from racing across the Latvian countryside in the first days of July 1941. General-major Aleksei V. Kurkin’s 3rd Mechanized Corps had virtually ceased to exist and the 12th Mechanized Corps had suffered 80 per cent losses, including its commander. General-major Dmitri D. Lelyushenko’s 21st Mechanized Corps gamely conducted a fighting retreat from Daugavpils and tried to make a stand against von Manstein’s SS Totenkopf Division at Rezekne, but was wrecked in the process. By the time he reached the Russian border near Ostrov, Lelyushenko had seven tanks and 3,000 troops left. All told, the Northwest Front had fewer than 100 tanks remaining, mostly T-26, to defend the approaches to Leningrad against Höpner’s Panzergruppe 4, which had at least 300 operational tanks.