Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 1943-1945: Red Steamroller

While Vatutin’s front was stymied, Konev enjoyed the greatest success from his bridgeheads located between Kremenchug and Dnepropetrovsk. When looking at the German Lage Ost (Situation East) maps for 1 October 1943, it appears that von Manstein had succeeded in creating a continuous line behind the Dnepr and that the few small Soviet bridgeheads were highly vulnerable to the converging German Panzer-Divisionen. However, in order to create this continuous front, von Manstein had to spread his depleted armoured units out across an 800km-wide front – his only reserves were whatever unit was inbound on the next train from France or Germany. In the Uspenka-Deriyivka sector (which was soon known as the Myshuryn Rog bridgehead), the PzAOK 1’s LII Armeekorps had the 23. Panzer-Division and Großdeutschland backing up two infantry divisions. While the presence of these units probably appeared sufficient to Hitler in Rastenburg, Großdeutschland only had 15 operational tanks (including five Tigers) and 23.Panzer-Division had seven tanks, nine SPWs and 1,100 infantry left.¹⁸⁶ Even worse, so many trucks had been lost in the retreat that panzer units were forced to borrow horses and wagons from nearby infantry units to conduct their resupply operations. Combat damage, worn-out equipment and mechanical defects had reduced almost all of von Manstein’s armoured units to minimal combat effectiveness. Further diluting their combat power, the remaining panzers were spread out to reinforce the weakened infantry, meaning that in order to employ anything larger than a tank platoon in any sector, the Germans were forced to strip other sectors of armoured support. The Soviets were quick to notice this new German weakness and began attacking sectors that had been denuded of armour. On 2 October, Konev’s infantry expanded their bridgehead and captured Myshuryn Rog; it took two days for 23.Panzer-Division to organize a counter-attack, which amounted only to a company of pioniers, some tanks and SPWs. By this time, Konev had a bridge built over the Dnepr near Borodaivka, on the eastern side of the Myshuryn Rog bridgehead, and was pushing tanks across. Furthermore, on 3 October, Konev received Rotmistrov’s 5 GTA, which had spent three weeks refitting in the rear. Rotmistrov stealthily moved his tank army 200km forward to the Dnepr in night marches, to avoid Luftwaffe reconnaissance.

Through great effort by the Instandsetzungsgrupe, the 23.Panzer-Division was able to repair 15 tanks by 7 October, including some of Fechner’s Panthers.¹⁸⁷ General der Panzertruppe Friedrich Kirchner, commander of LVII Panzerkorps, decided to commit both the 23.Panzer-Division and Großdeutschland to a joint counter-attack at Annovka and Borodaivka, in order to threaten the Soviet bridge site. On 8 October, Fechner’s Panthers attacked Soviet infantry at Annovka and managed to knock out three T-34s and 11 anti-tank guns, without loss. However, Großdeutschland’s attack on 9 October was poorly organized and five Tigers advanced toward Borodaivka without close infantry support. On this occasion, the Tiger’s powerful main gun and thick armour did not save them; all five tanks were surrounded and picked off at close range by concealed anti-tank guns and infantry tank destroyer teams. At least two crews were captured, the rest killed – a net loss of 25 Tiger crewmen.¹⁸⁸ Following this disaster, the German counter-attacks diminished somewhat, which allowed Konev a breathing space to begin moving the lead elements of Rotmistrov’s 5 GTA into the Myshuryn Rog bridgehead on the night of 14–15 October.

On the morning of 15 October, the Soviet 37th Army and 7th Guards Army attacked the thinly-held German perimeter south of Myshuryn Rog with four guards airborne divisions and three rifle divisions, following a massive artillery preparation. Rotmistrov was only able to contribute the 7 MC and part of 18 TC on the afternoon of the first day of the offensive.¹⁸⁹ Vormann’s 23.Panzer-Division was holding this sector with the depleted Panzergrenadier-Regiment 128 and divisional pioniers, but they were quickly overrun by this avalanche of men and tanks. Vormann committed his eight remaining tanks, but lost three Pz IVs when they encountered JSU-152 self-propelled guns and a wall of anti-tank guns. The remaining five German tanks retreated and Vormann’s other Panzergrenadier-Regiment was nearly surrounded by Soviet armour, so the entire 23.Panzer-Division fell back. Although seven of Rotmistrov’s T-34s were knocked out in the opening skirmishes, the German tankers noted that Soviet tanks had learned to use dead space to manoeuvre in order to reduce their vulnerability to anti-tank fire.¹⁹⁰ The Red Army was learning.