Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 1943-1945: Red Steamroller

Von Vormann’s XXXXVII Panzerkorps was able to organize a small relief effort fairly quickly with 11.Panzer-Division, which had 22 Panthers, three Pz IV and 13 assault guns, but just 1,000 Panzergrenadiers. A small Kampfgruppe from 13.Panzer-Division could also participate. On the morning of 1 February, von Vormann attacked and his Panthers easily sliced through two Soviet rifle divisions which had not yet dug in. In six hours, 11.Panzer-Division advanced 31km over the frozen terrain and reached the Shpolka River at Iskrennoye, less than 20km from Gruppe Stemmermann. However, when the Panthers attempted to cross a bridge over the river it collapsed, bringing the advance to a halt. Von Vormann was able to bring up pioniers to build a bridge for his StuG-IIIs, but AOK 8 lacked material to build a 60-ton pontoon bridge for the Panthers. Hitler also intervened in von Vormann’s relief operation, ordering him to wait since he was transferring the 24.Panzer-Division (which only had 17 tanks and 14 StuG IIIs) from the Nikopol bridgehead to reinforce him. Since this division was nearly 300km away and had to move via its own tracks, this was a remarkably stupid idea that helped to delay XXXXVII Panzerkorps when it had a brief window of opportunity. Instead, Hitler should have helped von Vormann to get bridging material forward, but the Führer was not interested in pontoon bridges. Instead, von Vormann paused at Iskrennoye, which allowed the Soviets to move the 29 TC and 49th Rifle Corps to block any further advance. Exacerbating von Vormann’s problems, temperatures rose to 5 degrees C (41 degrees F) which caused the ground to thaw, reducing mobility. Although von Vormann would continue to try and advance toward Gruppe Stemmermann for the next two weeks, he achieved no further significant advances.

German effort to relieve the Korsun Pocket, 1–16 February 1944.

Meanwhile, von Manstein did not immediately cancel Operation Vatutin against Katukov’s 1 TA, but by 30 January he ordered Hube to transfer Breith’s III Panzerkorps to mount a second relief operation from the southwest, which was designated Operation Wanda. Due to the muddy roads caused by the thaw and the difficulty extracting armoured units from the ongoing battles, it took longer than expected to assemble Breith’s III Panzerkorps for Operation Wanda. Breith’s corps initially consisted of the 16. and 17.Panzer-Divisionen, Schwere Panzer-Regiment Bäke and s.Pz.Abt.506 with a total of 105 tanks (48 Panthers, 41 Pz IV and 16 Tigers) and 21 assault guns. On the morning of 4 February, both Panzer-Divisionen attacked side-by-side, with two infantry divisions in support. Although the Soviet 104th Rifle Corps put up tough resistance and mines hindered the German advance, Breith’s two Panzer-Divisionen were able to advance nearly 19km on the first day. Vatutin committed Kravchenko’s 6 TA and an anti-tank brigade to block Breith’s panzers on the Gniloy Tikich, which was normally a minor obstacle but now widened by rain and melting snow. By the second day of Wanda, Breith’s forces ran into Soviet armour and indecisive tank skirmishing cost both sides vehicles. Despite reinforcements from 1.Panzer-Division and LSSAH, Breith’s advance was brought to a halt for a week. The Soviets had learned that the way to halt a German armoured drive was to constantly attack both flanks of a salient, which forced the Germans to divert troops to prevent from being cut off. Although this cost Kravchenko’s 6 TA many of its tanks, Vatutin received regular replacements – unlike the Germans. Furthermore, the lack of engineer support made it difficult to get heavy tanks across the Gniloi Tikich and Bäke’s panzers ran out of ammunition and fuel by the second day of the operation. Breith blamed the mud for reducing his mobility, but this tended to be a standard German excuse whenever a poorly-planned operation began to unravel. In Russia and the Ukraine, there was always mud.

By 6 February, both German relief efforts had been halted, 35–40km short of the Korsun pocket. Unlike Stalingrad, Gruppe Stemmermann was in no danger of starving to death, but Soviet pressure on the pocket was inexorably squeezing the defenders and forcing them to consume their ammunition. By 10 February, it was clear that Gruppe Stemmermann could not simply wait for relief and had to take some measures to increase the odds of a link-up with either Breith’s or von Vormann’s forces. Stemmermann decided to reposition his best division, Wiking, to be prepared to attack toward III Panzerkorps at the appropriate moment. SS-Brigadeführer Otto Gille’s Wiking had about 20 operational tanks (Pz III/IV) and several assault guns, as well as 47 artillery pieces (including 9 Wespe and 3 Hummel).