Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 1943-1945: Red Steamroller

The Stavka intended to use infantry, artillery and airpower to smash through Heeresgruppe Mitte’s front lines at multiple points, and then push its armour through to exploit deep into the rear. Zhukov and Vasilevsky were both familiar with Vladimir K. Triandafillov’s pre-war theories of Deep Battle (glubokiy boy) and intended to use a similar approach in the conduct of Bagration. As part of the Maskirovka (deception) effort, the bulk of the Red Army’s armoured formations remained with the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts, but the four fronts involved in Bagration were provided with six tank corps (1 TC, 1 GTC, 2 GTC, 3 GTC, 9 TC, 29 TC) and two mechanized corps (1 MC, 3 GMC), including Rotmistrov’s 5 GTA which was quietly transferred from northern Romania to Chernyakhovsky’s 3rd Byelorussian Front. These armoured formations had over 2,700 tanks. Soviet production was such that the Red Army could now begin to equip tank brigades entirely with T-34s and the T-70 light tanks began to phase out of service. About 20 per cent of the T-34s were the newest T-34/85 model, which was definitely superior to the Pz IV Ausf J. Some Soviet units were still equipped primarily with Lend-Lease armour, such as the 3 GMC, which had over 100 M4A2 Shermans and some Valentines and Churchills.⁴⁴ The number of JS-2 heavy tanks was still limited and only 80 in four regiments were available for Bagration. However, production of the Su-76M self-propelled gun was well advanced and over 1,000 SPGs would be involved in the offensive, as well as over 100 of the new JSU-122 which was capable of defeating Tiger tanks.

On 22 June, the four Soviet fronts began counter-reconnaissance and probing actions all along Heeresgruppe Mitte’s front, stripping away its outpost line. Then at 0500 hours on 23 June, the Red Army unleashed a two-hour artillery preparation unlike anything the Germans had previously experienced. Most Soviet artillery units fired two basic loads of ammunition during the preparation, meaning that a battery of 122mm howitzers fired 640 rounds each.⁴⁵ Although well dug in, the front-line German infantry positions were badly battered. Around 0700 hours, the ground attack began with specially-organized assault groups moving forward to clear obstacles and eliminate forward German positions. Unlike previous offensives, the Red Army avoided sending large masses of infantry forward until forward obstacles were breached and ensured that these assault groups were provided with adequate engineer support. The new PT-34 mine-roller tank was employed for the first time in quantity and it proved a success at rapidly clearing lanes through minefields. Although the German forward defences in the AOK 4 and AOK 9 sectors was still strong enough to repulse the initial attacks, it was a different story in Reinhardt’s PzAOK 3 sector. The 6th Guards Army and 43rd Army from Bagramyan’s 1st Baltic Front punched their way through the German IX Armeekorps defence west of Vitebsk while the 5th and 39th Armies from Chernyakhovsky’s 3rd Byelorussian Front smashed the VI Armeekorps south of Vitebsk. By the end of the first day of Bagration, it was clear that the two Soviet fronts were attempting a double envelopment of the LIII Armeekorps in the Vitebsk salient.

Busch was at Hitler’s headquarters when Bagration began and did not immediately grasp the scale of what he was up against. Hitler ordered ‘no retreat’ and Busch obeyed, without protest. In reality, it was really up to the local German commanders to decide how to respond to the Soviet offensive and thus the normal quick-thinking style of decision-making that characterized earlier German operations was not really evident in this situation. On 24 June, the Soviets increased the scale of artillery preparation in all sectors and this time, achieved small breakthroughs against AOK 4 and AOK 9, as well. The problem was that the German units were trying to hold too much frontline with too few troops, so inevitably the Soviet assault groups would find a weak spot. Near Orsha, the AOK 4 split the 20 Tigers of s.Pz.Abt.501 up across a wide area, trying to contain multiple enemy assault groups, but the dispersion into platoon-size packets robbed the Tigers of their ability to influence the battle. Although the Tigers, assault guns and Pak guns managed to knock out a significant amount of Soviet tanks, it was soon apparent that the Soviets were advancing much more quickly than thought possible. Reinhardt’s sector was the hardest hit and his front collapsed first. For the Germans soldiers in the front line of Heeresgruppe Mitte, Operation Bagration struck like a tidal wave, inundating all their fixed defences at a terrifying rate.