Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 1943-1945: Red Steamroller

Speer was not without talent, but as economic historian Adam Tooze has noted, his highly-touted ‘production miracle’ was part propaganda and unsustainable improvisations.²¹ The two levers that determined German tank production output were the availability of labour and steel, which were both constrained resources in the Third Reich’s wartime economy. Speer was able to temporarily get more steel for the Adolf Hitler Panzer Program, but as Tooze notes, this still only amounted to 15 per cent of the steel allotted for German armaments production; instead, the lion’s share of the monthly steel allotment went to ammunition and aircraft production. Speer was also able to get forced labor from the occupied countries. In 1941, there were fewer than 50,000 employees working in the entire German tank industry and its sub-contractors, but this was increased to 160,000 in late 1943. One-third of the new workers were low-skill and unmotivated foreign workers.²² Furthermore, Germany’s industrial priorities kept shifting between aircraft, ammunition, tanks, U-Boats, the Atlantic Wall project and other flavour-of-the-month projects like the V-2 rocket, which made it difficult to establish consistent levels of output. Shortages of copper and rubber also made it difficult to increase tank production; Germany imported most of its copper and a large percentage of it went for ammunition production, but each Pz IV required 195 kg of copper.²³ Likewise, tanks needed rubber for their road wheels and by 1943, German factories were forced to make a new type of roadwheel that used 50 per cent less rubber; it worked, but it was noisier and wore out more quickly.²⁴ Speer had Hitler’s full backing in centralizing Germany’s armaments industry and increasing AFV production. An easy decision, taken late in 1942, was to terminate Pz III production and instead have the Alkett factory focus exclusively upon StuG III Sturmgeschütz production. By early 1943, Speer’s organizational reforms were beginning to bear some fruit as German tank and assault gun production slowly began to increase, but it would be March before Pz IV monthly production broke the 200-mark and October before it went over 300. Guderian cooperated closely with Speer in trying to increase German tank production and both realized that the only efficient way for Germany to narrow the gap with Soviet tank output was to focus on one or two proven designs. Guderian favored focusing on boosting Pz IV production to at least 400 per month and delaying the introduction of the Panther until it was thoroughly tested and its technical defects remedied. He was ignored.

Hitler respected Guderian, but had limited tolerance for his brash opinions. On the other hand, Dr Ferdinand Porsche, who had developed the Volkswagen in 1936, had Hitler’s ear – even though that project had only been a propaganda success.²⁵ Porsche not only joined the Nazi party, but the SS as well, and Hitler recognized him as a ‘great German engineer’. Once the war began, Porsche sought ways to contribute to the military effort – and to stay in Hitler’s inner circle – so he connived to get himself appointed as Hauptausschusses Panzerwagen und Zugmaschinen, in charge of managing tank production – but he was a dismal failure. Next, Porsche decided to try his hand at designing tanks, despite the fact that he had no technical experience at all in designing armoured vehicles. Porsche developed his concepts of tank design from his imagination, not from practical requirements based upon combat experience or the needs of front-line tankers. Indeed, Porsche was particularly enamoured of gargantuan-size tanks, even though these were inconsistent with the German Army’s Bewegungskrieg manoeuvre doctrine – of which he was ignorant. However, what Porsche lacked as a tank designer, he made up for as a sycophant, being able to convince Hitler that his ridiculous projects deserved priority.