Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 1943-1945: Red Steamroller

Order No.325 began the process of Red Army tankers learning from their mistakes and trying to close the gap in capabilities between them and their German opponents. The order stressed the importance of a well-planned artillery preparation and close-infantry tank coordination in the attack. Instead of tangling with German tanks – as had often happened in 1941–42 – Soviet tank corps were ordered to focus on destroying the enemy infantry, leaving artillery and anti-tank units to deal with German tanks. The order also stressed proper terrain reconnaissance and the use of surprise and deception (maskirovka) to catch the enemy off guard. Of course, it was easy for Stalin to dictate orders, but this standard became the doctrinal guidepost for the Red Army’s tankers heading into 1943.

One of the foremost tactical and doctrinal changes that the Red Army did begin to adopt in 1943 was the introduction of the Samokhodnaya Ustanovka (SUs or self-propelled guns), which were modelled on the German Sturmgeschütz. The Su-76, which mounted the reliable 76.2mm ZIS-3 anti-tank gun on a lengthened T-70 chassis, could be built in great quantity. The Su-122, mounting a 122mm howitzer on a T-34 chassis, offered Soviet mechanized infantry units a real boost in direct fire support. Altogether, the creation of regimental-size units equipped with SUs reflected a desire within the Red Army to hand off much of the infantry support mission to AFVs other than tanks. Although early technical problems slowed the introduction of the SU-equipped regiments in 1943, this step would gradually free more tanks to conduct offensive manoeuvre warfare rather than being tied to infantry units. Those tanks that remained in the infantry support role were increasingly assigned to the new separate tank regiments.

In 1942, the Red Army had created tank armies and tank corps, but they were really just large collections of tanks with little in the way of supporting arms. This began to change in 1943, as the Red Army absorbed combat lessons learned from the Germans at great cost in 1941–42 and laboured to create their own balanced combined arms formations in line with Stalin’s Order 325. In January 1943, the NKO moved to strengthen Tank Corps by adding a mortar regiment with 36 120mm mortars and an SU Regiment equipped with 8 SU-76 and 8 SU-122s. Furthermore, in order to improve the staying power of the Tank Corps, it was authorized an additional 33 T-34 and seven T-70 as spares; the addition of an extra battalion’s worth of tanks would give Red Army tankers an edge in attritional battles like Kursk. In February 1943, the engineer component in the Tank Corps was upgraded from a company-size unit to a battalion. In March, the same increase occurred with the integral signal unit and an anti-aircraft regiment with 16 37mm guns was added. In April, the NKO decided to increase the anti-tank component of the Tank Corps in response to the improvement of German armoured capabilities, particularly the Tiger tank; each Tank Corps was authorized an anti-tank regiment, which had a mix of 20 45mm, 57mm and 76.2mm guns, and a separate anti-tank battalion with 12 towed 85mm 52-K AA guns. The decision to employ the 85mm 52-K AA gun to counter German heavy armoured vehicles would substantially add to Soviet defensive capabilities at Kursk.