Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 1943-1945: Red Steamroller

Beginning in early December 1942, General-major Vasiliy A. Khomenko’s 44th Army began mounting regular attacks with infantry and tanks all across the front of the 3.Panzer-Division. Khomenko was another NKVD officer with limited field experience and he had only a few small tank units, but the Soviet attacks were relentless and began to wear down the German defences. In three weeks of heavy defensive combat, the 3.Panzer-Division’s Panzer-Regiment 6 lost a battalion commander and two veteran company commanders, while the commander of the SPW-equipped I./Panzergrenadier-Regiment 3 was also killed. Overall, PzAOK 1 suffered more than 5,000 casualties in December 1942. Khomenko’s 44th Army also paid a heavy price for its aggressiveness, including 8,037 troops captured and 68 tanks lost, but its combat capabilities were actually increasing. Although Hitler was reluctant to cede territory since he believed that he could restart his Caucasus offensive in 1943, he finally agreed to let von Kleist pull back the XXXX Panzerkorps’ most exposed positions and to create a straighter front line.

Nevertheless, by the end of December 1942 Westhoven’s 3.Panzer-Division was in very poor condition. Due to the shortage of spare parts, the division only had about 30 operational tanks and a similar number of SPWs. Worn-out track and engines could not be replaced. Repeated enemy artillery bombardments damaged the rubber jacket on tank road wheels, which then led to ‘chunking’ when the vehicle moved, often resulting in track pins becoming bent or broken. However, there were no replacement road wheels or track pins en route. Thus, even the tanks that were declared operational had numerous mechanical faults, which degraded their performance. Panzer-Regiment 6 had started the campaign with three Panzer-Abteilungen, but was now forced to consolidate all of its remaining tanks into Panzer-Abteilung Stockmann. The surplus crews of the III./Pz.Regt. 6 were put into the line as infantrymen. Ammunition was in very short supply, as were radio batteries, which forced the Germans to limit their use of tactical radios. However, the worst deficiency was the crippling lack of fuel; the OKH gave priority of fuel to Generalfeldmarschall’s Erich von Manstein’s Heeresgruppe Don and Heeresgruppe A was told in late November to expect no more fuel deliveries for the time being. The supply situation became so critical that 3.Panzer-Division’s logistic troops shifted entirely to Russian Panje carts for resupply of forward areas.⁴ Consequently, the 3.Panzer-Division could not conduct a mobile defence and was forced to disperse its combat power into company-and battalion-size stützpunkt (strongpoints). By Christmas, it was obvious even to Hitler that PzAOK 1 could not remain in place and had to pull back or face gradual destruction. On 30 December, Hitler authorized PzAOK 1 to withdraw 100km to a line from Pyatigorsk to the Kuma River, to begin at dusk on 2 January 1943.

On the Soviet side, the Stavka wanted to follow up its success at Stalingrad by trapping Heeresgruppe A in the Caucasus. The Soviet South and Southwest Fronts were about to begin an offensive against Heeresgruppe Don with the objective of taking Rostov, which would sever von Kleist’s line of communications. The Northern Group’s mission was to push back von Kleist’s PzAOK 1 and herd them toward destruction around Rostov. Meanwhile, the Black Sea Group, which had only a single tank brigade and a few OTBs, would mount supporting attacks against the 17.Armee around Tuapse and Novorossiysk, with the end goal of clearing the Kuban. The Stavka anticipated a ‘second Stalingrad’ in the Caucasus, with the bulk of Heeresgruppe A becoming isolated and eventually destroyed. However, in this case the Germans were aware of the danger and less inclined to be caught like fish in a barrel.