Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 1943-1945: Red Steamroller

Hitler ordered that Kharkov was to be held at all costs, but Hausser did not see it that way. Both of his divisions were fixed in place holding off Rybalko’s constantly attacking 3TA and Großdeutschland was fending off the 69th Army’s attacks, but there were no significant reserves left to stop Moskalenko’s advance into the city. As the Soviets began to threaten to cut the German lines of communication into the city, by evening of 14 February Hausser requested permission to evacuate the city. Both von Manstein and Lanz refused this request. However, Hausser had no intention of dying in place and at 1645 hours he ordered his two divisions and the Großdeutschland to begin evacuating the city. At 1800 hours von Manstein ordered Hausser to stop the withdrawal, but Hausser refused to comply. Throughout 15 February the SS units disengaged his units and conducted a tactical withdrawal through the city and to the southwest through Merefa. Soviet artillery bombarded the city, but otherwise the Soviets did not make a major effort to interfere with the evacuation. The final rearguard consisted of Major Otto-Ernst Remer’s I./Grenadier-Regiment Großdeutschland (equipped with SPWs) and Hauptmann Peter Frantz’s Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung Großdeutschland.[13] On 16 February, Rybalko’s tankers met up with Kravchenko’s tankers in the centre of the city, completing the liberation of Kharkov.

For a few days, Golikov’s forces were tied up in the congested streets of Kharkov, but on the morning of 18 February Rybalko sent Koptsov’s 15th Tank Corps probing to the west and encountered Großdeutschland’s blocking positions. About 20 Soviet tanks, including T-34s, overran two German infantry companies, then knocked out two German tanks. At the same time, Zinkovich’s 12th Tank Corps attacked the 320.Infanterie-Division at Merefa and captured the town. Generalkommando z.b.V. Raus, which controlled these two divisions, was strained on 19–20 February to prevent Rybalko from attacking into the rear of the SS-Panzerkorps, which had pivoted to the southeast and was assembling for a counter-attack. Hausser was forced to detach both the SS-Schützen-Regiment Thule and the SS-Totenkopf-Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung to reinforce Raus’s faltering command. Nevertheless, Rybalko attacked again on 19 February and forced Großdeutschland and the SS-Regiment Thule to retreat.

The Backhand Blow, 19 February–16 March 1943

Once Kharkov was lost, von Manstein’s situation actually improved because the SS-Panzerkorps was no longer tied to the defence of the city and at least part of it could be employed where it would cause the most trouble to the Red Army. Although both the Das Reich and LSSAH had suffered substantial losses in the defence of Kharkov, including at least 60–70 tanks lost or damaged, the fresh Totenkopf Division was detraining at Poltava and added considerable capability. On the night of 18–19 February, the SS-Panzerkorps was assigned to Hoth’s 4. PzAOK, which had been moved westward to direct part of von Manstein’s counter-offensive in coordination with von Mackensen’s 1.PzAOK. On the other side of the hill, both Vatutin’s and Golikov’s forces were nearly spent and well beyond their supply lines, but still advancing. Rybalko’s 3TA had lost about 60 tanks around Kharkov and had 100 or less still operational, and its supporting rifle divisions were at 30–50 per cent strength. Rybalko requested permission to rest and refit his armoured units for three days but was refused by Golikov, who wanted the armour to keep pushing westward against Generalkommando z.b.V. Raus. Popov’s Armoured Group was in particularly poor shape, but Vatutin committed his last reserves – the 1st Guards Tank Corps (1GTC) and 1st Guards Cavalry Corps (1GCC) – to re-energize its efforts. On 19 February, the 111th Tank Brigade from Pavlov’s 25th Tank Corps captured Slavograd, only 36km from Zaporozhe. Nevertheless, the only Soviet forces that were still able to achieve significant advances were the infantry-based 40th and 69th Armies, which were pushing westward against feeble opposition from Armeeabteilung Kempf and Generalkommando z.b.V. Raus, creating a salient between Heeresgruppe Süd and Heeresgruppe Mitte.