The Augustan Empire 43 BC

Octavian had further problems too. There had been trouble in Gaul since the previous year, which had culminated in a full-scale revolt in Aquitania. By the end of 3 8 this had been dealt with by Agrippa, but this merely replaced one embarrassment with another: Agrippa's glory contrasted too obviously with Octavian's own defeats, and Agrippa tactfully went without a triumph.[57] And Octavian's control of Italy was not beyond reproach. Public life was unusually disordered, with a shortage of candidates for some offices, while in other cases magistrates were hastening to resign their offices: in 3 8 there were no less than sixty- seven praetors.[58] And the popular riots were continuing, including some support of a new favourite, a certain M. Oppius. Predictably, he soon died.[59] Any pretence of normality was wearing very thin.

Another meeting was clearly needed. Antony sailed for Italy in early spring 37: he was accompanied by 300 ships. The menace was unmistak­able. Perhaps he claimed he was coming to help Octavian against Sextus;[60] if so, he was naturally disbelieved, and it seems that the townsfolk of Brundisium refused to admit the fleet.[61] Bewildered and nervous, they doubtless trusted that Octavian would applaud them. Antony sailed to Tarentum instead, and Octavian travelled there to meet him. Lepidus was again unrepresented. Negotiations were slow, and it was perhaps latejuly or August before agreement was reached.[62] The questions were indeed delicate: it was certainly not clear that it was in

Antony's interests to support Octavian at all emphatically against Sextus. The mediation of Octavia, it was said, was crucial¹¹³ - possibly romantic fiction once again, but she may indeed have played a part.

Finally Antony agreed to back Octavian against Sextus, who was stripped of his priesthood and his promised consulship. Octavian was to carry through the war, but it was agreed that he should delay his attack on Sextus to the following year: it was doubtless Antony who pressed for this, for it offered him the hope of synchronizing his invasion of Parthia with this further war in Italy. The propaganda possibilities were clear: while Sextus and Octavian were refusing to let the civil wars die, Antony would be doing what Roman generals should always have done, advancing the empire and spilling foreign blood. It was all to work out rather differently. They further agreed that Octavian would give Antony 20,000 men and 1,000 elite troops in return for 120 men-of-war and ten skiffs.¹¹⁴ The deal made sense, for Octavian vitally needed reinforce­ments for the fleet which Sextus had damaged so badly, while Antony had recently been unable to recruit Italian troops. But, from his viewpoint, there was one drawback. He left the ships there and then. Octavian merely promised the troops. They never came.

There was a further problem, of a constitutional sort. The triumvirate had formally expired at the end of 38, leaving the triumvirs' position uncomfortably vague. Probably nobody knew whether their power was now illegal. The triumvirate was an irregular magistracy: to which regular magistracy should it be regarded as analogous? To the consul­ship, which had a fixed term of one year, but formally ended when the consuls abdicated their office on the last day? On the one hand, the term had passed; on the other, the triumvirs had not abdicated.¹¹⁵ Or perhaps it was closer to a provincial governorship, normally assigned by senatus consultum, which continued until a successor was appointed and arrived? Here there were no successors. In some ways the vast task rei publicae constituendae left the triumvirs more closely analogous to a dictator, who was similarly appointed for a specified purpose and held his office until he abdicated on completion of the task: now the res publico was certainly not yet constituta. But the early, traditional dictatorship had also had a maximum duration of six months, and that had been scrupulously observed:¹¹⁶ what would have happened had a dictator outstayed that

App. ВСя>.9з. 390-1,96.397; Dio xlviii. 54. j;and especially Plut. Ant. 35. Wallmann 1989(0 243) 181-2 thus explains Octavia's prominence on coins of 37-36 celebrating the accord (CRR 12 56, 1262, 1266).

App. BCiv. V.9J.396-7; cf. (with slightly different, less credible numbers) Plut. Ant. 35.7; Brunt 1971 (a 9) J02.

The constitutional puzzle certainly exercised the minds of contemporaries: cf. the elaborate treatment of similar issues at Livy, ш.36.9, 38.1, И-5^-6 (decemvirs not laying down their office when their term expired; the decemvirate was an irregular magistracy like the triumvirate); ix.33—4 (similar behaviour by a censor). ¹¹⁶ Cf. Mommsen 1887 (a 6;) n.i³ 161.