The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War 1936-1939

André Marty, in a long report to Moscow, gave his explanation for Caballero’s dogged resistance to the communists. ‘Caballero does not want defeat, but he is afraid of victory. He is afraid of victory, for victory is not possible without the active participation of the communists. Victory means an even greater strengthening of the position of the Communist Party. A final military victory over the enemy means for Caballero and the whole world the political hegemony of the Communist Party in Spain. This is a natural and indisputable thing…a republican Spain, raised from the ruins of fascism and led by communists, a free Spain of a new republican type, organized with the help of competent people, will be a great economic and military power, carrying out a policy of solidarity and close connections with the Soviet Union.’¹³ Although this blatant declaration of communist ambitions in republican Spain did not coincide with Stalin’s plans, the Comintern does not appear to have discouraged the idea in any way.

The political infighting over Asensio Torrado at Valencia came immediately after the power struggle between Miaja and Pozas. Having increased his responsibilities to include both the Jarama and Guadalajara fronts, Miaja was to have overall command during the largest battles of the first year of the civil war, including the only well-known republican victory, Guadalajara.

Franco’s decision to continue with the second half of the pincer operation was as unjustifiable as launching the Jarama offensive on its own.¹⁴ Varela’s troops were supposed to recommence their advance towards Alcalá de Henares, but the nationalist forces on the Jarama front were incapable of recreating any momentum.¹⁵ It may be that Franco continued with the operation in response to the misplaced optimism of the Italians after the Málaga walkover. The advance was to be almost entirely an Italian affair.

General Roatta now had some 35,000 men in General Coppi’s Llamas Negras Division, General Nuvolini’s Flechas Negras, General Rossi’s Dio lo vuole Division and General Bergonzoli’s Littorio Division. The last had regular officers and conscripts; the other formations contained fascist militia. This force of motorized infantry was supported by four companies of Fiat Ansaldo miniature tanks, 1,500 lorries, 160 field guns and four squadrons of Fiat CR 32 fighters, which poor visibility and water-logged airfields were to render virtually non-operational. Mussolini’s appetite for military victory pushed on the officers commanding these ‘involuntary volunteers’ whom he had now managed to have concentrated in an independent command.

The republican general staff appears to have been aware of the growing threat to the Guadalajara sector on the Madrid–Saragossa road, but only one company of T-26 tanks was sent to reinforce the thinly spread and inexperienced 12^th Division under Colonel Lacalle.

On 8 March, at first light, Coppi’s motorized Black Flames Division, led by armoured cars and Fiat Ansaldos, smashed straight through the republican lines in the Schwerpunkt manner. On their right the 2nd Brigade of the Soria Division commanded by the recently promoted Alcázar defender, General Moscardó, also broke the republican front, but they were on foot and soon fell behind. During that day fog and sleet reduced visibility to 100 metres in places. Bad weather continued on 9 March and the Italians allowed their attack to slow down while they widened the breach in the republican front. That night they stopped to rest because their men were cold and tired (many of their militia were still in tropical uniforms). This break in the momentum of the attack was incompatible with blitzkrieg tactics and was all the more serious since there was no co-ordinated attack on the Jarama front. Roatta sent urgent requests to Franco, but nothing was done.¹⁶ English and French strategists (with the notable exceptions of Liddell Hart and Charles de Gaulle) were to point to the Guadalajara offensive as proof that an armoured thrust was a worthless strategy. The Germans, on the other hand, knew that it had not been followed properly and that the Italian forces were ill trained for such a manoeuvre in the first place.