The Bombing War: Europe 1939-1945

The first priority was to reform and expand the provision of shelter and welfare. Anderson had already set in motion programmes for improvement, though much still depended on the initiative and resourcefulness of local authorities. In mid-September Lord Horder, chairman of the British Medical Association, had been asked to report on shelters in London in view of the potential threat of epidemics and public disorder. He had recommended installing bunks and proper sanitary facilities, spraying the walls with antiseptic, delousing bedding (and sleepers), appointing shelter marshals, and regular inspections by the local medical officers of health.¹⁰⁶ Morrison, together with the Minister of Health, Malcolm MacDonald, set about implementing many of the recommendations. In late September a set of standard by-laws for conduct in shelters was drawn up and finally published as an Order in Council on 4 December. The orders prohibited smoking, animals, cooking, noisy conduct and musical instruments, and denied access to anyone drunk or whose ‘person or clothing is offensively unclean or verminous’ or who spat or defecated in the shelter.¹⁰⁷ Social discrimination was encouraged by the new regulations. Vagrants and alcoholics were barred from shelters and in London were accommodated during raids by a volunteer pacifist group in Westminster. Wardens were also told to police prostitution by ‘firmly and discreetly’ telling a woman to desist from soliciting, as long as they were reasonably certain that that was what she was doing. Popular hostility to East End Jews, who became the butt of some of the protest during the early raids for allegedly sitting all day in the shelters, was mitigated by the establishment of separate Jewish rest and feeding centres where kosher food was provided and Yiddish spoken.¹⁰⁸

The shelter programme nevertheless required more than rules for exclusion and shelter discipline. A programme was begun to install thousands of bunk beds in two or three tiers in all public and many domestic shelters. Morrison introduced a ticketing system to control entry to London shelters. Heating and lighting, mainly absent from surface shelters, were slowly introduced, while programmes to drain and cover over the floors of flooded Anderson and brick shelters were begun. The shortage of labour and materials meant dividing the country into A, B and C zones, with priority for shelter improvement in the A zone of major urban areas. Each of the twelve civil defence regions was asked to appoint a Regional Shelter Officer to coordinate the activity.¹⁰⁹ Morrison also introduced a new portable shelter which bore his name to supply the many thousands who chose to stay in their homes rather than use garden or public shelters. It was designed by an engineer in the ministry’s Research and Experiments Division late in 1940 and approved after a demonstration on New Year’s Day 1941 in front of Churchill. Shaped like a large table, it had a flat surface top, steel frame and wire mesh sides and could withstand a fall of debris. Production depended on the availability of steel and the first models were ready only in March 1941 when the Blitz was nearing its end. By August 298,000 had been delivered.¹¹⁰ By this stage 1,330,000 bunks had been installed in Underground stations, communal shelters, basements and Andersons with orders on hand for a further 3 million; half a million Anderson shelters (60 per cent of the whole) had been given concrete flooring. In May 1941 London could sleep 461,000 in bunks and had public and domestic shelter accommodation for 86 per cent of the population, though much of it still remained unused.¹¹¹

The medical and welfare conditions for the homeless and for shelterers were also subjected to a thorough overhaul. It was decided in December 1940 that responsibility for this aspect of shelter and rescue should be given over fully to the Ministry of Health. One of the problems in organizing effective welfare since September was the absence of a clear demarcation of function. On 31 December the Ministry of Home Security took over responsibility for the number, siting and construction of shelters, while the Ministry of Health assumed control over everything that went on inside – health, welfare, public order, food and entertainment. This still produced some overlap, since Morrison remained responsible for the welfare provided by local civil defence authorities outside the shelters, but it eased the confusion that had existed when the bombing began.¹¹²