The End: The Defiance and Destruction of Hitler’s Germany, 1944–1945

83. See Hans Mommsen, ‘The Dissolution of the Third Reich’, in Frank Biess, Mark Roseman and Hanna Schissler (eds.), Conflict, Catastrophe and Continuity: Essays on Modern German History, Oxford and New York, 2007, pp. 110–13 (a reprint of ‘The Dissolution of the Third Reich: Crisis Management and Collapse, 1943–1945’, Bulletin of the German Historical Institute, Washington DC, 27 (2000), pp. 9–23).

84. Speer, Erinnerungen, Frankfurt am Main and Berlin, pp. 401–2; Joachim Fest, Speer: Eine Biographie, Berlin, 1999, pp. 306–7.

85. Speer, Erinnerungen, pp. 405–7; and for the contradictions in the ‘total war’ effort, see Janssen, pp. 274–82.

86. TBJG, II/13, p. 526 (20.9.44).

87. Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy, London, 2006, p. 637.

88. BAB, R3/1538, fo. 7, Speer handwritten letter to Hitler, 29.3.45.

89. See DRZW, 5/2 (Müller), p. 755.

90. TBJG, II/13, p. 147 (23.7.44).

91. Guderian, p. 351.

92. BA/MA, RW4/57, fos. 27–31, Ansprache des Chefs WFSt Gen. Oberst Jodl, 24.7.44. For Jodl’s stance after the assassination attempt, see also Bodo Scheurig, Alfred Jodl: Gehorsam und Verhängnis, Berlin and Frankfurt am Main, 1991, pp. 282–6.

93. BBC Archives, The Nazis: A Warning from History (1997), written and produced for BBC2 by Laurence Rees, Beta Tape 59, pp. 102–3: Karl Boehm-Tettelbach, Luftwaffe Operations Chief on OKW-Führungsstab, interview with Laurence Rees, c. 1995–6.

94. Orlow, p. 465; Kunz, p. 115; DRZW, 9/1 (Förster), p. 623. Keitel and Bormann agreed that uniformed members of the Party and the Wehrmacht had the duty to greet each other with the ‘Heil Hitler’ salute to demonstrate the unity of political will and the common unbreakable loyalty to the Führer. Lammers extended this to civil servants.—BAB, R43II/1194b, fos. 90–94, text of Anordnung from Keitel and Bormann, fo. 93, 26.8.44.

95. TBJG, II/13, p. 146 (23.7.44).

96. Manfred Messerschmidt, Die Wehrmacht im NS-Staat: Zeit der Indoktrination, Hamburg, 1969, pp. 433–7 (text of the order on p. 435); DRZW, 9/1 (Förster), p. 625, (Heinemann), p. 884. Guderian’s own account of his appointment as Chief of the General Staff is in his Panzer Leader, pp. 339–44, though he does not mention this order. A brief, critical sketch of Guderian is provided by Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm, ‘Heinz Guderian—“Panzerpapst” und Generalstabschef’, in Ronald Smelser and Enrico Syring (eds.), Die Militärelite des Dritten Reiches, Berlin, 1995, pp. 187–208. In the same volume, Peter Steinbach, ‘Hans Günther von Kluge—ein Zauderer im Zwielicht’, p. 308, describes Guderian as ‘the willingly deferential instrument of the undignified “self-cleansing” of the Wehrmacht from “traitors” until a few weeks from the end of the war’.

97. Messerschmidt, Die Wehrmacht im NS-Staat, p. 441. On the history (and pre-history) of the NSFOs generally, see Waldemar Besson, ‘Zur Geschichte des nationalsozialistischen Führungsoffiziers (NSFO)’, Vf Z, 9 (1961), pp. 76–116; Gerhard L. Weinberg, ‘Adolf Hitler und der NS-Führungsoffizier (NSFO)’, Vf Z, 12 (1964), pp. 443–56; Volker R. Berghahn, ‘NSDAP und “geistige Führung” der Wehrmacht 1939–1943’, Vf Z, 17 (1969), pp. 17–71; Messerschmidt, Die Wehrmacht im NS-Staat, pp. 441–80; and the comprehensive treatment in DRZW, 9/1 (Förster), pp. 590–620.

98. See DRZW, 9/1 (Förster), pp. 620ff.

99. Kunz, p. 114.

100. Besson, p. 113; DRZW, 9/1 (Heinemann), p. 884.

101. Wolfram Wette, Die Wehrmacht: Feindbilder, Vernichtungskrieg, Legenden, Frankfurt am Main, 2002, p. 190. On p. 189, Wette gives the number of full-time (hauptamtliche) NSFOs as 623 at the end of 1944. It is unclear why there is a discrepancy with the figure of 1,074 given in DRZW, 9/1 (Förster). The training of the NSFOs was carried out by a staff based in the Party Chancellery. By the end of 1944 it had held thirteen training courses, attended by 2,435 participants. Some 1,300 lectures a week were given to members of the Wehrmacht on ideological matters.—Kurt Pätzold and Manfred Weißbecker, Geschichte der NSDAP 1920–1945, Cologne, 1981, p. 371.

102. BA/MA, RH19/IV/250, fos. 41–2, Richtlinien für die NS-Führung, Nr. 6/44, Kommandeur der 242. Infanterie-Division, 22.7.44.

103. On a rough estimate—precision is impossible—some 700 officers were arrested and 110 executed for their participation in the attempted coup.—DRZW, 9/1 (Heinemann), pp. 882–3.