The End: The Defiance and Destruction of Hitler’s Germany, 1944–1945

2. Hitler and his Generals: Military Conferences 1942–1945, ed. Helmut Heiber and David M. Glantz, London, 2002, pp. 539–40 (12.12.44).

3. Walter Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters 1939–45, pb. edn., Novato, Calif., n.d. (original Eng. language edn., London, 1964), pp. 475–8; DRZW, 7 (Vogel), pp. 619–20.

4. Hermann Jung, Die Ardennenoffensive 1944/45, Göttingen, 1971, p. 218 (Kreipe diary, 16.9.44); DZW, 6, pp. 124–5.

5. John Erickson, The Road to Berlin, Cassell edn., London, 2003, pp. 394–7; Brian Taylor, Barbarossa to Berlin: A Chronology of the Campaigns on the Eastern Front 1941 to 1945, vol. 2, Stroud, 2008, pp. 248–59.

6. Max Hastings, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany 1944–45, London, 2004, pp. 202–25.

7. DRZW, 7 (Vogel), p. 615.

8. DZW, 6, pp. 212–13; DRZW, 7 (Vogel), pp. 615–16; Hastings, pp. 218–20; Joseph Balkoski, ‘Patton’s Third Army: The Lorraine Campaign, 19 September–1 December 1944’, in Albert A. Nofi (ed.), The War against Hitler: Military Strategy in the West, Conshohocken, Pa., 1995, pp. 178–91.

9. Wilfred von Oven, Finale Furioso: Mit Goebbels bis zum Ende, Tübingen, 1974, pp. 517–18 (3.12.44); TBJG, II/14, pp. 339–41 (3.12.44); BAB, R55/608, fo. 34, Verbal Propaganda Slogan, No. 11 (18.12.44). The suddenness of the fall of Strasbourg and the chaotic attempts to evacuate the population were emphasized in an eyewitness account, later sent on to Himmler.—BAB, NS19/606, fos. 2–4^v, report on the events in Strasbourg on 22–3 November 1944 (19.12.44). A propaganda report from Baden underlined the ‘enormous shock effect’ throughout the region that resulted from the fall of the city. Streams of refugees engulfed the right bank of the Rhine. The depressed mood of the people reached a low point. Trust was ‘extremely shaken’.—BAB, R55/21504, unfoliated, Gaupropagandaleiter, Reichspropagandaamt Baden, Bericht über die Propagandaführung im Gau Baden, 15.1.45.

10. Hastings, p. 225.

11. Hitler and his Generals, p. 541 (12.12.44) and p. 1038 n. 1556.

12. See Franz Kurowski, ‘Dietrich and Manteuffel’, in Correlli Barnett (ed.), Hitler’s Generals, London, 1990, pp. 411–37 for pen-pictures.

13. DZW, 6, pp. 126–8; DRZW, 7 (Vogel), pp. 621–2; Warlimont, p. 485; Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader, Da Capo edn., New York, 1996, p. 380.

14. Warlimont, pp. 481–5; Guderian, p. 380; Scheurig, p. 305; BA/MA, RH21/5/66: Manteuffel: ‘Die 5. Panzerarmee in der Ardennenoffensive’ (deposition for US Historical Division, 1946), fo. 50; BA/MA, N6/4, Oberst G. Reichhelm (Model’s Chief of Staff), ‘Zusammendfassender Bericht über die Kampfhandlungen der deutschen Herresgruppe B von Mitte Oktober 1944 bis Mitte April 1945’ (deposition for US Historical Division, 1946–7), fos. 14–15; Guenther Blumentritt, Von Rundstedt: The Soldier and the Man, London, 1952, pp. 264–9; DRZW, 7 (Vogel), p. 620; DZW, 6, p. 125; Siegfried Westphal, Erinnerungen, Mainz, 1975, pp. 294–300: Walter Görlitz, Model: Strategie der Defensive, Wiesbaden, 1975, pp. 222–5; David Downing, The Devil’s Virtuosos: German Generals at War 1940–5, London, 1977, pp. 231–3.

15. Quoted Warlimont, pp. 489–90. Jung, pp. 201–2, argues that the only alternative course of action open to them—to resign—would have given the command to less able generals and increased German losses.

16. See Warlimont, pp. 481–2.

17. NAL, WO219/1651, fos. 144–5, SHAEF: interrogation of Jodl, 23.5.45.

18. Quoted DZW, 6, pp. 129–30.

19. For an assessment of the catastrophic collapse, largely in the second half of 1944, see John Zimmermann, Pflicht zum Untergang: Die deutsche Kriegführung im Westen des Reiches 1944/45, Paderborn, 2009, pp. 40–65.

20. IWM, FD 3063/49, Box 368/54, deposition of Speer (13.7.45). On the economic impact of bombing in 1944, see Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won, London, 1995, pp. 130–31; and Dietrich Eichholtz, ‘Deutschland am Ende des Krieges: Eine kriegswirtschaftliche Bilanz’, Bulletin der Berliner Gesellschaft für Faschismus- und Weltkriegsforschung, 6 (1996), pp. 22–3, 27–30.

21. IWM, FD 3063/49, Box 367/26, deposition of Speer (13.8.45); Box 368/67, deposition by Saur (2–8.10.45). For the armaments situation leading up to the Ardennes offensive, see Jung, ch. 2.

22. IWM, FD 3063/49, Box 367/34, depositions of Saur and Kehrl (13.8.45).