The End: The Defiance and Destruction of Hitler’s Germany, 1944–1945

100. The above account relies, except where otherwise stated, on BA/MA, N245/3, NL Reinhardt, ‘Kalenderblätter 1945’, fos. 83–4 (22–7.1.45); N245/2, NL Reinhardt, Briefe, fos. 41–2 (22.1.45, 26.1.45); N245/15, Heidkämper, fos. 68–72, 76–87; N24/39, ‘Erinnerungen von General d.I. a.D. Friedrich Hoßbach’, typescript (May 1945), pp. 45–6, 68. See also Friedrich Hoßbach, Die Schlacht um Ostpreußen, Überlingen, 1951, pp. 51–73; Guderian, pp. 400–401; Dieckert and Grossmann, pp. 94–5, 110-18; DZW, 6, p. 511.

101. e.g. BA/MA, RH21/3/730, fos. 3–6, ‘Auskünfte Gen.Major Mueller-Hillebrand (Chef des Stabes) über den Einsatz der 3. Pz. Armee in Ostpreußen, Sept. 1944–Feb. 1945’ (1955); ‘Auszug aus einem Bericht von Oberst i.G. Mendrzyk O.Qu. bei der 3. Panzer-Armee’.

102. Quoted Schwendemann, ‘Das Kriegsende in Ostpreußen’, p. 98.

103. Schwendemann, ‘Tod zwischen den Fronten’, p. 43. I am most grateful to Dr Schwendemann for the reference to the source for these comments, BA/MA, RH20/4/617, unfoliated, Notizen über Ferngespräche 14–25.1.45, Gesprächsnotizen vom 24.1.45 (Hoßbach addressing leading officers at 16.00 hours that day, and speaking to Reinhardt that evening at 22.15 hours), and to Dr Jürgen Förster for obtaining for me a copy of the document.

104. BA/MA, N712/15, NL Pollex, Auszüge aus Briefen, fo. 12, 22.1.45.

105. N24/39, NL Hoßbach, ‘Erinnerungen’, pp. 46–7; Hoßbach, p. 70. That Rendulic´ had a less than complete comprehension of the situation in East Prussia when he arrived there seems clear. He had as recently as 17 January been appointed by Hitler as Commander-in-Chief of Army Group Courland, and had been in Courland no more than twelve hours when, on 26 January, he was suddenly informed that he had to take over the command of Army Group North, besieged in East Prussia.—Lothar Rendulic´, Gekämpft, Gesiegt, Geschlagen, Wels, 1952, pp. 331–2, 336.

106. Guderian, pp. 400–401. Rendulic´, pp. 337–55, provides a description of his period, a little over six weeks, in command in East Prussia, until 12 March, though it contains only a few inconsequential lines on Hoßbach’s dismissal on p. 343.

107. Guderian, p. 394.

108. Hastings, p. 283; Roland Kaltenegger, Schörner: Feldmarschall der letzten Stunde, Munich and Berlin, 1994, pp. 265–6; Siebel-Achenbach, pp. 59, 71–2. Hitler had initially intended Field-Marshal Model to take over the command. It was decided, however, that he was urgently needed in the west, so the command was given to Schörner.—TBJG, II/15, pp. 135 (16.1.45), 138 (17.1.45).

109. Quoted DRZW, 10/2 (Kunz), p. 39.

110. BA/MA, N60/74, NL Schörner, ‘Tragödie Schlesien, März 1945’, fo. 2 (1958).

111. BAB, NS6/353, fos. 157–8, Bormann, Bekanntgabe 28/45, Ungehorsam und falsche Meldungen, containing Keitel’s order in appendix; also IfZ, Fa-91/4, fo. 1069.

112. Himmler’s command had, it seems, already been agreed some days earlier, in the main, according to Goebbels, because ‘a firm hand’ was needed to turn troops ‘flooding back’ from the path of the Soviets into new fighting units. Goebbels even suggested making Himmler Commander-in-Chief of the Army, to relieve Hitler of this duty, but Hitler was unwilling to go so far and stated that Himmler first had to prove he could master operational command.—TBJG, II/15, pp. 165 (20.1.45), 181 (22.1.45), 195 (23.1.45).

113. DZW, 6, p. 513.

114. IWM, FO645/155, interrogations of Karl Dönitz, 30.9.45, p. 5; 2.10.45, p. 2 (in English).

115. IfZ, ZS 1810, Bd. II, fo. 54, Dönitz interview with Barry Pree, 18.11.74.

116. Quoted Schwendemann, ‘Endkampf’, p. 20; also Schwendemann, ‘Tod zwischen den Fronten’, p. 45.

117. Goebbels thought Göring, when he spoke with him on 27 January, ‘almost defeatist’ and depressed, hoping even now that Hitler would try to find a political solution.—TBJG, 15/II, p. 250 (28.1.45)

118. DZW, 6, p. 572.

119. DRZW, 9/1 (Heinemann), p. 884.

120. DRZW, 9/1 (Heinemann), p. 882.

121. DRZW, 10/1 (Lakowski), p. 559.

122. DZW, 6, pp. 575, 591.

123. David K. Yelton, Hitler’s Volkssturm: The Nazi Militia and the Fall of Germany, 1944–1945, Lawrence, Kan., 2002, p. 131.

124. Quoted DZW, 6, p. 513.

125. DZW, 6, pp. 513–14.

CHAPTER 6. TERROR COMES HOME

1. See in general, for a similar interpretation, Robert Gellately, Backing Hitler: Consent and Coercion in Nazi Germany, Oxford, 2001.

2. For the malevolent depiction of Jews, which showed no diminution as Jews were deported from Germany, see Jeffrey Herf, The Jewish Enemy: Nazi Propaganda during World War II and the Holocaust, Cambridge, Mass., 2006, and Herf’s contribution, ‘ “Der Krieg und die Juden”: Nationalsozialistische Propaganda im Zweiten Weltkrieg’, in DRZW, 9/2, pp. 159ff.