The End: The Defiance and Destruction of Hitler’s Germany, 1944–1945

145. TBJG, II/15, pp. 328–9 (7.2.45), 334–5 (8.2.45), 357, 359 (11.2.45). Goebbels admitted that he needed a new directive from Hitler if he were to overcome obstacles to meet the target of 768,000 men needed by the following August and force the armaments industry to give up a monthly quota of 80,000 men, which they were resisting. His frustrations were recorded by von Oven, Finale Furioso, pp. 575–7 (8.2.45).

146. Von Oven, Finale Furioso, p. 587 (25.2.45).

147. TBJG, II/15, p. 364 (12.2.45).

148. Rudolf Semmler, Goebbels—the Man Next to Hitler, London, 1947, pp. 183–4 (18–20.2.45); Ralf Georg Reuth, Goebbels, Munich and Zurich, 1990, pp. 581–2. The suggestion appealed to Hitler, and was dropped only when it was pointed out by his military advisers that such an appalling breach of the Geneva Convention could backfire drastically, since the Allies might use their superiority in the air to start using gas and chemical warfare and, anyway, held more prisoners than those in German hands.—IMT, vol. 35, pp. 181–6, doc. 606-D. Hitler had already told Goebbels before the attack on Dresden that, should the British go over to gas warfare he would have 250,000 British and American prisoners of war shot.—TBJG, II/15, p. 368 (12.2.45).

149. Von Oven, Finale Furioso, p. 571 (7.2.45).

150. Von Oven, Finale Furioso, pp. 587–8 (25.2.45); and see also p. 577 (9.2.45). Goebbels suggested in mid-February providing an opening to the British, but Hitler thought—as he invariably did—that the right point for this had not been reached. In any case, Goebbels had just told Hitler that it was crucial to hold the west; that was more important than losing territory in the east.—TBJG, II/15, pp. 367–8 (12.2.45).

151. TBJG, II/15, pp. 337 (8.2.45), 366 (12.2.45).

152. Von Oven, Finale Furioso, p. 582 (16.2.45).

153. TBJG, II/15, pp. 379–81 (13.2.45).

154. TBJG, II/15, p. 383 (28.2.45).

155. BAB, R3/1535, fos. 18–28, Zur Rüstungslage Februar–März 1945, with statistical appendices, fos. 29–31, quotation fo. 28, 30.1.45.

156. TBJG, II/15, p. 290 (1.2.45).

157. Speer, p. 432.

158. Speer, p. 428, refers to Hitler’s clash with an angry Guderian over withdrawal of troops from the Courland, which the latter had pressed for, as a possible sign of a drop in authority. The fact was, however, that Hitler’s word was final. The troops cut off in the Courland remained there.

159. TBJG, II/15, pp. 311 (5.2.45), 338 (8.2.45).

160. Von Oven, Finale Furioso, p. 588 (25.2.45). Forster claimed to have told Hitler directly to seek negotiations with the western powers. However, Hitler’s secretary Christa Schroeder, Er war mein Chef: Aus dem Nachlaß der Sekretärin von Adolf Hitler, Munich and Vienna, 1985, p. 74, recalled what was, presumably, a subsequent meeting from which Forster, who had been determined to tell Hitler in most forthright terms of the despairing situation in Danzig, came away revitalized and certain that Hitler could save Danzig.

161. Karl Wahl, ‘… es ist das deutsche Herz’: Erlebnisse und Erkenntnisse eines ehemaligen Gauleiters, Augsburg, 1954, p. 385. Almost twenty years later Wahl produced a very similar, but if anything even more apologetic, version of the meeting, in Karl Wahl, Patrioten oder Verbrecher, Heusenstamm bei Offenbach am Main, 1973, pp. 155–61.

162. Wahl, ‘… es ist das deutsche Herz’, p. 386.

163. Rudolf Jordan, Erlebt und erlitten: Weg eines Gauleiters von München bis Moskau, Leoni am Starnberger See, 1971, pp. 251–8 (quotations, pp. 257–8).

164. TBJG, II/15, p. 323 (6.2.45); Speer, p. 431.

165. TBJG, II/15, p. 377 for Hitler’s recognition that Yalta meant there would be no break in the coalition; and p. 381 for the communiqué, and Goebbels’ reaction to it. A British intelligence report on 22 February suggested that ‘the very hopelessness of Germany’s fate after the war may be one of the reasons for the continuance of a struggle which daily becomes more desperate’.—Hastings, Armageddon, p. 417. For the negotiations at Yalta, see DRZW, 10/2 (Loth), pp. 289–300. The outcome of the Conference was not immediately made known to the German public, though detailed information—gleaned in the main from illicit listening to foreign broadcasts—soon seeped out.—Das letzte halbe Jahr, pp. 251–2 (23.2.45).

166. Speer, p. 433.

CHAPTER 7. CRUMBLING FOUNDATIONS

1. BA/MA, MSg2/2697, diary of Lieutenant Julius Dufner, fo. 151, 7.4.45.