The End: The Defiance and Destruction of Hitler’s Germany, 1944–1945

Propaganda, in his view, had the vital task of reinforcing the will to resist, ‘in strengthening the backbone of the nation again and restoring its diminished self-confidence’.⁶² Ceremonies held throughout Germany where the newly created Volkssturm swore their oaths of allegiance—around 100,000 men in ten separate ceremonies in Berlin alone on Sunday, 12 November—were part of this task. In seasonal mist and with the ruins of the Wilhelmplatz as a macabre backdrop, Goebbels addressed the arrayed Volkssturm men from the balcony of the Propaganda Ministry. ‘Some are already armed,’ he recorded in his diary—unwittingly acknowledging the impoverished levels of support for the new organization. In fact, rifles, bazookas and some machine guns had been handed out just before the ceremony. Few of the men knew how to use them, but in any case they had to give them up again once the ceremony was over. Silence fell across the square as, lacking uniforms, they doffed their caps and hats in an oath to the Führer before marching past ‘in sacred earnestness’. Everything was filmed to make a big impression in the newsreels. The optical effect was excellent, remarked Goebbels’ aide Wilfred von Oven. But what the cameras did not show were young boys and soldiers on leave standing on the footpaths and doing their best not to laugh at the march-past. The Volkssturm was not worth ‘a shot of powder’ in von Oven’s view.⁶³

As a further attempt to maintain fighting spirit, Goebbels had in 1943 commissioned the colour film Kolberg—a grand spectacular aimed at turning the defence of the Pomeranian coastal town of that name during the Napoleonic Wars into a heroic epic to inspire the present-day defenders of the Reich.⁶⁴ By the end of 1944 the film—with an enormous cast of extras, apparently including 187,000 soldiers temporarily removed from active service at a time when new recruits for the front were being so desperately sought—was almost ready. Goebbels was hugely impressed, on seeing a rough-cut at the beginning of December, by what he called a ‘masterpiece’ that ‘answered all the questions now bothering the German people’. He had great expectations of the film, which he thought worth ‘a victorious battle’ in its likely impact on the mood of the public.⁶⁵ But he feared ‘scenes of destruction and despair’ would have the effect that in the current situation many Germans would decide against viewing it.⁶⁶ As the comment betrays, Goebbels was fully aware of the uphill task he faced in overcoming the deep pall of gloom in Germany as the disastrous year of 1944 neared its close.

IV

The reports reaching Goebbels from the regional propaganda offices left no doubt of the worrying state of morale. News of the success in repelling the Red Army in East Prussia made scarcely a dent in the depressed mood in early November. Feelings ranged from extreme anxiety about the future and anger at being left defenceless as bombs rained down on German cities to wearied resignation (also among Party members, especially in the west) and fatalism. Large parts of the population just wanted ‘peace at any price’.⁶⁷ In western regions, where the population was most exposed to the nightly horror of devastation from the skies, now being inflicted upon most of Germany’s big industrial cities, the mood was at rock bottom. Amid the jangled nerves and constant worry, Goebbels noted, ‘outright anger towards the Party, held responsible for the war and its consequences’, could be heard.⁶⁸

It was scarcely surprising. Cologne, for instance, was subjected to another huge attack on the night of 30 October in what one witness described as the city’s ‘death blow’. The quarter of a million people still living there—until the heavy raids started there had been around 800,000—had no gas or electricity. The little water available was only to be had at hydrants in the street. The NSV distributed meagre food rations to people standing in queues. Almost all remaining habitable parts of the city were now destroyed. There was a stampede to leave as masses of refugees gathered with their few possessions at the Rhine bridges. But an immediate organized evacuation was impossible because of lack of transport. The rail crisis meant trains could not be laid on. Any military vehicle going east was stopped and loaded to capacity with those fleeing the city. There was much bitterness directed at the regime and a sense of the futility of the conflict. The exodus lasted for more than a week. Cologne was now ‘virtually a ghost city’. As Goebbels put it, ‘this lovely Rhine metropolis has at least for the time being to be written off’.⁶⁹