The Great Terror

Evidence of such was indeed unregistered. But when Stalin was on holiday, Lazar Kaganovich reported to him. We have for some time had a letter from him to Stalin of 2 August 1932, saying that two (unnamed) members of the Politburo had objected to or criticised the draft of the 7 August 1932 terror decree’s vital second and third paragraphs. On 29 August of that year Stalin complained that in his absence Kaganovich and Molotov had (on another issue) allowed the Politburo to take an ‘incorrect’ and dangerous position, sponsored by Ordzhonikidze, with even Kaganovich ‘in the camp of reactionary elements’ – soon overruled by the lone absentee.28 This question of opposition, also clear from Gorbachev’s testimony, is important to our understanding of the period. Stalin was later to obtain a more acceptable Politburo.

The finally revealed full text of Stalin’s speech at the crucial ‘February—March 1937’ plenum that followed the suicide of Ordzhonikidze (presented at the time as a heart attack) has him several times praising Ordzhonikidze, then deploring his having, behind the Party’s back, kept up a relationship with the deviationist V. V. Lominadze (himself a suicide in 1935).29 Such an accusation levelled at a living Communist at the time would have been followed by arrest and purge.

In a report on counter-revolutionary groups in Georgia (dated 20 July 1937) to Stalin (addressing him as ‘Dear Koba’) from Beria, then only Secretary of the Communist Party of Georgia, we read ‘evidence has been given that Sergo Ordzhonikidze had, willingly or unwillingly, given much moral and material support to former Georgians and Transcaucasians transferred from Georgia and Transcaucasia, giving factual help to them in their counter-revolutionary work against the Party’.30 Obviously Beria would not have dreamt of such a suggestion unless sure of a welcome. And he follows it up with a letter (20 September 1937) quoting the ‘confession’ of Orakhelashvili telling of Ordzhonikidze being ‘the soul of our counter-revolutionary struggle with the Party leadership of Georgia’.31

So now there is even a better reason than before to see a hostile relationship, already deducible from the later arrest of his family, the change of place names previously given in his honour and so on. And now, too, in the decensored version of Anastas Mikoyan’s Memoirs, the point is made that for several years Stalin suggested to his circle that Ordzhonikidze might have been a British spy.32

11

This book has been faulted for giving too little attention to the context of Russia and of the Russian historical and mental backgrounds.

George Orwell wrote more than half a century ago, ‘Till recently it was thought proper to pretend that human beings are very much alike, but in fact any one able to use his eyes knows that the average of human behaviour differs from country to country. Things that could happen in one country could not happen in another.’

Much of that is implicit in the whole story. But I perhaps need to develop it a little more broadly and not merely in a general way, but as a particular insight into the minds of the main characters. How does this affect our subject? We find what seem to be contradictions. Any reader of the country’s great literature may feel an especially Russian humanism arising from the depths of the ‘national character’. On the other hand, Ronald Hingley (in his classic The Russian Mind) saw the fictional and the real Russian as living in great dullness interspersed with, or accompanying, extreme arbitrariness, but also possessed by a view of the country’s past and present as deplorable yet containing as recompense a wonderful future with some sort of national glory compensating for everything. A complementary trait often reported is the fear that a Russian, or Russia, is being deceived or cheated – the sort of thing we see in Gogol’s Dead Souls, and in Soviet xenophobia.

The broader problem is – to this day – not primarily economic or even political. It is a certain lack of much feeling for community in the sense of a civic or plural order. Both the new Western liberal element and the old traditional Christian element of Russia, facing their crisis before a truly successful amalgam had been attained, were to be crushed by a compound of a different kind, formed from an archaic brutality and an imported theoretical-terrorist tradition. An odd fideism.

Thus the ‘ruling class’ appears as the product of centuries of history of personal and collective experiences, of indoctrination, and of psychological suitability to surviving those experiences and accepting that indoctrination, while the country’s recent and present political structure derives in part from the entire Russian background and in part from the specific Communist inheritance.