The Great Terror

Like Stalin, Kamenev had lived in Tbilisi as a boy, and had gone from the Tbilisi Gymnasium to be a law student in Moscow. He was again in Tbilisi, representing the Party, in the early years of the century, when Stalin was barely known. He had been in the Butyrka jail when a student. After his underground work, he had stayed abroad between 1908 and 1914 as Lenin’s closest collaborator after Zinoviev. He did not follow Lenin quite so closely as Zinoviev did, but worked for compromise with the Mensheviks and later, in Russia, dissociated himself from Lenin’s defeatism in the First World War. After the February Revolution in 1917, he came back from exile in Siberia with Stalin, and they launched a program of support for the Provisional Government. When Lenin returned and insisted on a more revolutionary attitude, Kamenev alone continued to resist this view. In October 1917 he joined Zinoviev in opposing the seizure of power, attracting Lenin’s violent, though temporary, rage. From 1918 on, he stuck to the Party line. He was not ambitious and was always inclined to moderation. In any case, he had neither the will power nor the judgment to compete adequately in the new phase.

Zinoviev and Kamenev had no truly outstanding adherents, but their following nevertheless included men like Lashevich (Vice Commissar for War, who was later to die before the Purges), G. E. Evdokimov (Secretary of the Central Committee), and a number of other powerful figures. Moreover, Zinoviev still controlled the Leningrad Party, and it voted solidly against Stalin’s majority. There was thus the curious sight of the organizations of the Party “representing” the workers of Leningrad and of Moscow respectively passing unanimously resolutions condemning each other. “What,” Trotsky asked ironically, “was the social explanation?”²¹

Once again, Stalin was able to appear the moderate. He represented Zinoviev and Kamenev as wanting to destroy the majority. In passages which were to require much amendment in later editions of his Works, he asked, “You demand Bukharin’s blood? We won’t give you his blood.” And again: “The Party was to be led without Rykov, without Kalinin, without Tomsky, without Molotov, without Bukharin…. The Party cannot be led without the aid of those comrades I have just named.”²²

Defeated, Zinoviev and Kamenev, who had been particularly strong against Trotsky, now turned to him for support, forming “the United Opposition.” This involved their accepting the left-wing line on economic policy, and it automatically ranged against them the followers of Lenin’s line, in particular Bukharin and his supporters. By 1926, as Souvarine remarks, Trotsky had “more or less already handed Stalin the dictatorship by his lack of foresight, his tactic of patient waiting broken by sudden and inconsequent reactions, and his mistaken calculations,” but his final mistake was the forming of this bloc with Zinoviev and Kamenev, “men devoid of character or credit who had nothing concrete to offer to offset the disrepute they brought with them.”²³ Trotsky did not understand what the Party now was or the nature of the problem he faced.

In April 1926, Evdokimov, the only Zinovievite on the Secretariat, was removed. In July, Zinoviev was expelled from the Politburo, being replaced by the Stalinist Rudzutak; and in October, Trotsky and Kamenev were expelled in turn. In October, the opposition submitted. Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotsky, Pyatakov, Sokolnikov, and Evdokimov denounced their own offenses,²⁴ a most striking precedent for the long series of self-denunciations by the oppositionists.