The Great Terror

By the beginning of 1933, many circles in the Party previously unconvinced about the possibility of success began to alter their attitude and to accept that Stalin had in fact won through. As Kamenev was made to remark at his trial in 1936, “Our banking on the insuperability of the difficulties which the country was experiencing, on the state of crisis of its economy, on the collapse of the economic policy of the Party leadership had obviously failed by the second half of 1932.”²⁵ The “victory” did not amount to the creation of an efficient industry and agriculture. But the Party, which had staked its existence on winning the battle against the peasantry, had succeeded in crushing them, and a collective farm system was now firmly established.

By early summer, a certain relaxation took place in all fields. In May 1933, a decrease of peasant deportations to a figure of 12,000 households a year was ordered by a secret circular signed by Stalin and Molotov.²⁶ In the same month, Zinoviev and Kamenev were brought back from Siberia to make another confession of error.

Pravda published a piece by Kamenev, condemning his own mistakes and calling on the oppositionists to cease any resistance.²⁷

The former theological students among them—and there were always a surprising number of these in the Party, from Stalin and Mikoyan down to men like Chernov—might have remembered the scenes which took place after the Council of Nicaea, when one of the more extreme Arians remarked to a colleague who had surrendered, “Thou hast subscribed to escape banishment, but within the year thou shalt be as I am.” But it is also true that even the opposition was often won over by the victory of Stalin’s line and the successes gained, at whatever cost, in industry.

Moreover, the rise of Nazism in Germany was a strong shock. Stalin had played on a quite implausible war scare in the late 1920s, trapping Trotsky in particular into implying that even in war he would oppose the leadership—a sure formula for accusations of “traitor.” But no serious figure had been shaken by the maneuver. Now Rakovsky and Sosnovsky, the last leading oppositionists in exile, finally made their peace with the regime, giving the war danger as their main motive. Rakovsky, who earlier seems to have been badly hurt in an attempt to escape, had pointed out that even Lenin had expressed qualms about the power of the Party, and that since his death it had become ten times more powerful. Getting to the heart of the dispute, he had said, “We have always based ourselves on the revolutionary initiative of the masses and not on the apparatus.” He had added that no more faith could be placed in “enlightened bureaucracy” than in “the enlightened despotism of the seventeenth century.”²⁸ But now he was persuaded. He was welcomed back by Kaganovich in person.²⁹ It was plain that an air of general reconciliation was prevalent.

Radek had long since become a shameless adulator of Stalin, detested by the less venal oppositionists. He pleased Stalin greatly by an article purporting to be a lecture delivered in 1967 at the School of Interplanetary Communications, on the fiftieth anniversary of the October Revolution. At this date (now far behind us) the World Revolution had evidently triumphed and looked back on Stalin as its most brilliant architect. Radek was put up early in 1934 to distinguish between the old oppositionists who merely lacked “proper understanding and will” and the “alien” Trotsky—a striking token of peace with the Zinovievs and Bukharins.³⁰ (Trotsky himself had been meanwhile writing that the slogan “Down with Stalin” was wrong³¹ and that “at the present moment, the overthrow of the bureaucracy would surely serve counter-revolutionary forces.”)³²

If Stalin’s special talents had been vital during the crisis, he now no longer seemed quite so essential to the Party’s survival. But if it had been impossible to remove Stalin at a time when the Party and the regime were engaged in a desperate struggle, it now became difficult for a different reason: he was the victor, the man who had won against all the odds. His prestige was higher than ever.

It began to be hoped not so much that Stalin would be removed, as that he would take a more moderate line, lead a movement of reconciliation, adjust to the Party’s desire to enjoy the fruits of victory in comparative peace. He might be expected to retain the leadership but to let many of his powers devolve. Alternatively, he might be given a more senior, but less powerful post. “In seasons of great peril, ’tis good that one bear sway”; but when the danger is past, more constitutional ways return.