The Great Terror

When it came to Soviet history, and Stalin’s Terror, there was, as on other themes, some sharp disagreement in the Politburo – later to produce the attempted coup of 1991. It is only now that records of these disputes have been published.7 Much of this centred in the rehabilitation of Bukharin. It was even urged (in Gaidar Alley’s words) that ‘the liquidation of the kulaks as a class was a political concept, that did not imply the physical annihilation of people’!

More fundamentally one finds Gorbachev telling his colleagues: ‘Millions rehabilitated – that is the great service done by Nikita Khrushchev.’ Why did this ‘stop short?’ he asked: ‘because Khrushchev too had blood on his hands.’ As to his successors, they had done their best to keep the truth unknown: ‘Under Brezhnev, under Andropov, under Chernenko even members of the Politburo had no information.’8

Gorbachev goes on to tell the full story of the Seventeenth Congress of the CPSU in 1934 (long rejected in pro-Soviet circles) with the number of votes against Stalin – and that there was indeed a serious attempt to remove him from the leadership. As to what followed, Stalin’s ‘use of the Kirov murder to bring in repression’, the only motive being ‘the struggle for power’ is described. And, Gorbachev adds, ‘Plots against him – that’s all rubbish (chepukkha).’9

He then speaks of ‘three million sentenced, and that the most active part of the nation. A million shot. And that is not counting the share of dekulakisation and the fate of people at the time of deportations. And this was Stalin. How can that be accepted, let alone forgiven?’10

But the whole direction of glasnost, among other things, brought a mass of officially banned knowledge out of hiding. The first public mention in Russia of my book was when Katrina van den Heuvel interviewed me for Moskovski Novosti (2–9 April 1989). When I was in Moscow later that year, it was all over. Through the decade there had been little reply to the book from the Party establishment. But now the Stalinist writer Aleksandr Chakovsky called me ‘anti-Sovietchik number one’ at the last plenum of the Central Committee. By that time the Russian edition was being serialised (in a million copies each month) in Neva.

Over the next four or five years I was welcomed in Russia, making many friends, speaking to cultural and other groups and at conferences hosted by the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Going into Izvestiya to collect payment for a contribution to a Moscow journal, I saw Bukharin’s portrait hanging along with those of the other former editors. I spent some weeks being filmed round the country for Red Empire, a documentary series made by Granada Television, which aired not only in the West in English, but also in the Soviet Union (in Ukrainian, Kazakh and Russian).11 Among those I had met earlier abroad, it was hard not to relish Andrei Voznesensky’s saying the could hardly believe I was there: could he pinch me to make sure? As to the breadth of reception, I was interviewed by Kommunist12 – though only later having interesting meetings with Gorbachev, Shevardnadze and others.

And now, for the first time in twenty years, the new openness had uncovered so much new material that it became possible, and even necessary, to produce a new edition of this book. The Great Terror: A Reassessment was published in 1990. Much had emerged seriatim in the years since the original 1968 edition, but particularly over the recent glasnost period.

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The information now available – even what was available in the late 1960s – established the story clearly as to historical essentials, and in a generally correct way as to almost all crucial details. But we were soon like modem historians of an ancient empire who have had to rely on a few inscriptions, some only recently deciphered, when a huge store of first-hand records is discovered under some pyramid. Enough for generations of archaeologists…

Even under glasnost we had to search for information, for evidence. Now, into the twenty-first century, there is so much of it that to produce a truly new ‘version’ of this book would require a regiment of researchers, to sift out and to boil down the available myriads of documents that researchers have meanwhile found. Much has been printed from the presidential, the State, the Party and the police archives, both central and provincial. Russia’s Federal Security Service is reported to have declassified over two million secret documents in the past fifteen years, but of course there are more.13 The sheer amount of material is such that there is still something new every week or so. It is only as I draft this introduction that those astonishing 1985–91 Politburo reports have become available in book form.