The Historians' History of the World 05

At the beginning of the campaign the weakness of the Carthaginian naval forces had decided Rome to attempt to transfer the theatre of war to Africa and remain on the defensive on the Ebro. By crossing the Alps—a possibility which had never entered into Roman calculations—Hannibal made Italy the scene of the decisive struggle. After a victorious cavalry engagement not far from the Ticinus he enticed the Roman army posted at Placentia to cross the Trebia and then defeated it; only the smaller half of it made its way back to the fortress. He eluded the consul Sempronius, who was posted at Ariminum, crossed the Apennines into Etruria and destroyed the army of Flaminius in the narrow defiles on the shores of Lake Trasimene. Fabius Cunctator (the Dilatory) now persistently avoided joining issue with him, but when Hannibal marched through the provinces of middle Italy, pillaging as he went, the Romans ventured once more upon a pitched battle. At Cannæ, in Apulia, he found himself face to face with a force of eighty thousand men, and by a master-stroke succeeded in not merely defeating but positively annihilating the Roman troops in the open field with a force of only half their number (216 B.C.). It was the signal for the desertion of most of the allies (exclusive of the Latin colonies). Capua, Samnium, Lucania, Bruttium, and Apulia took the lead, and presently the whole of south and middle Italy went over to Hannibal, including even Tarentum. Syracuse revolted, and thus Sicily seemed lost; and Philip of Macedonia declared war against Rome (215 B.C.). But the policy of Rome was equal to the emergency. She contrived to win the Greek states of the second and third rank over to her interests. The Ætolians and Illyrians, Pergamus and Rhodes, kept Philip employed and prevented him from rendering Hannibal active assistance. Rome’s fleet ruled the sea and successfully hindered any coalition between the hostile powers, and thus the Carthaginians could neither save Syracuse, nor send adequate reinforcements to Hannibal, nor effect a junction with Philip’s fleet. Doughty commanders like Marcellus, the conqueror of Syracuse, contrived to exhaust his troops by frequent attacks.

The cause of the war in Italy presently began to stagnate more and more, especially after Capua and Tarentum had been retaken (in 211 and 209). Once, and once only, did the Carthaginians venture again to play for high stakes. Hasdrubal had skilfully evaded the Romans in Spain and had reached north Italy by way of the Pyrenees and Alps, intending there to join hands with his brother Hannibal (early in 207 B.C.). It was a critical moment, for both the consuls of the year 208 had fallen in battle. The speedy succour which the newly elected consul, Claudius Nero, despatched to his colleague, Livius, decided the victory in favour of the Romans. Hasdrubal lost both his army and his life (at Sinigaglia) on the banks of the Metaurus.

In the meantime the Romans had succeeded in wresting Spain from the Carthaginians. The two elder Scipios, Publius and Cneius, who, after fighting with varying fortune, had advanced as far as the Guadalquivir, both lost their lives in 211 B.C. But Publius Scipio the Younger, afterwards known as Africanus, a man of Hannibal’s own temper, had taken New Carthage (209 B.C.), defeated the Carthaginian armies at Bæcula (208) and Silpia (207), and occupied Gades, the southernmost city of Spain, in 206.

Carthage, nevertheless, could only be conquered in Africa. This view had little to commend it in the eyes of many a prudent member of the senate so long as Hannibal remained in Italy. For all that, Scipio succeeded in transferring the theatre of war in 204 from his own province of Sicily to northern Africa. Allying himself with the Numidian prince, Masinissa, he defeated the Carthaginians and their ally, Syphax of Mauretania, in the year 203 B.C., and brought the war to a close by the decisive victory of Zama (202 B.C.), in which he routed Hannibal, who had returned from Italy, and the flower of his troops.

Carthage lost not only her fleet and foreign provinces, but her sovereignty itself; she was not allowed to go to war without the permission of Rome, while an irksome sentinel was set over her in the person of her adversary, Masinissa, who had been enriched with Punic territory.

Even after this catastrophe the Carthaginians did not utterly lose heart. Their commerce soon revived and prospered, and Hannibal did all he could to restore the prestige of his native city as long as the Romans tolerated his presence there, and to raise up fresh enemies to Rome after he had been driven into exile.