The Mammoth Book of Cover-Ups

BCCI’s clients for money-laundering included Panamanian General Manuel Noriega, for whom it managed some $23 million of criminal proceeds out of its London branches; Pablo Escobar, of the Medellin cartel; Rodriguez Gacha, of the Medellin cartel; and several members of the Ochoa family.

Bribery

Bribery was a key component of BCCI’s strategy for asset growth worldwide, from the earliest days of the bank. In some cases, the recipients of funding from BCCI may not have considered the payments to be «bribes,» but simply a mechanism by which BCCI obtained what it wanted from an official, and in return the official helped BCCI, such as BCCI’s payments to two of the Gulf emirs in return for the use of their names as nominees for the purchase of First American. In other cases, the bribes were naked and direct quid pro quos, such as BCCI’s payments to Central Bank officials in return for Central Bank deposits in countries like Peru. In other cases, BCCI made campaign contributions to politicians, such as it did with General Zia in Pakistan and Carlos Andres Perez in Venezuela. In still other cases, BCCI’s payments came in the guise of charitable contributions, and provided BCCI with an entree to generate deposits from others, as in the case of President Jimmy Carter. Among the Americans who BCCI provided with financial assistance in addition to Carter were US Ambassador to the United Nations Andrew Young, Bert Lance, and Jesse Jackson. Abroad, important figures with extensive contact with BCCI included former British Prime Minister James Callaghan, then United Nations Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar, Jamaican prime minister Edward Seaga, Antiguan prime minister Lester Byrd; a large number of African heads of state; and many Third World central bank officials.

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Support of Terrorism and Arms Trafficking

BCCI’s support of terrorism and arms trafficking developed out of several factors. First, as a principal financial institution for a number of Gulf sheikhdoms, with branches all over the world, it was a logical choice for terrorist organizations, who received payment at BCCI–London and other branches directly from Gulf-state patrons, and then transferred those funds wherever they wished without apparent scrutiny. Secondly, BCCI’s flexibility regarding the falsification of documentation was helpful for such activities. Finally, to the extent that pragmatic considerations were not sufficient of themselves to recommend BCCI, the bank’s pan-third world and pro-Islam ideology would have recommended it to Arab terrorist groups.

Arms trafficking involving BCCI included the financing of Pakistan’s procurement of nuclear weapons through BCCI Canada, as documented in the Parvez case, involving a Pakistani who attempted to procure nuclear-related materials financed by BCCI through the United States.

In a letter of 22 November 1991 to the Subcommittee, the CIA stated that «the Agency did have some reporting [as of 1987] on BCCI being used by third world regimes to acquire weapons and transfer technology,» but was unwilling to elaborate on the nature of this activity in public.

In early August, 1991, the Committee was provided with documents from the Latin American and Caribbean Region Office (LACRO) of BCCI, describing the offer for sale by the Argentine air force of 22 Mirage aircraft for $110 million. The planned sale was to have been made to Iraq, as part of Saddam Hussein’s massive military build up prior to the Gulf war. BCCI was acting as the broker for the transaction, which was to take place in August or September of 1989, but not completed as a result of a dispute within the Argentine military itself. Arms sales involving BCCI from Latin America to the Middle East remain, as of April 1992, under active investigation by US law enforcement.

Abu Nidal

In the United Kingdom, a key window on BCCI’s support of terrorism was an informant named Ghassan Qassem, the former manager of the Sloan [sic] Street branch of BCCI in London. Qassem had been given the accounts of Palestinian terrorist Abu Nidal at BCCI, and then proceeded, while at BCCI, to provide detailed information on the accounts to British and American intelligence, apparently as a paid informant, according to press accounts based on interviews with Qassem.

As of 1986, the information obtained about Abu Nidal’s use of BCCI was sufficiently detailed as to justify dissemination within the US intelligence community.

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Other terrorist groups continued to make use of BCCI, including one «state sponsor of terrorism,» and the Qassar brothers, Manzur and Ghassan, who have been associated with terrorism, arms trafficking, and narcotics trafficking in connection with the Government of Syria, and with the provision of East Bloc arms to the Nicaraguan contras in a transaction with the North/Secord enterprise paid for with funds from the secret US arms sales to Iran.

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Prostitution