The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB

We must take a step back in order not to fall into the abyss, and agree on the creation of self-governing trade unions. We have no other political means of normalizing the situation, and it is impossible to use force. By staging a [tactical] retreat, we can regroup Party forces and prepare for offensive action.

The Poles went through the motions of seeking “the opinion of Comrade Brezhnev,” recognizing that trade unions free from Party control were “not simply a Polish issue but an issue which affects the interests of the entire Socialist community.”⁴¹ In reality, however, all alternatives to the legalization of Solidarity had already been ruled out. The Gdańsk Agreement of August 31, which accepted “the formation of free trade unions as a genuine representation of the working class,” made a series of unprecedented political concessions, ranging from the right to strike to an agreement to broadcast Mass every Sunday over the state radio. Wałęsa signed the agreement in front of the television cameras with an outsize, garishly colored pen, which he drew with a flourish from his top pocket. Produced as a souvenir of the papal visit, it had on it a portrait of John Paul II.⁴²

THIRTY THE POLISH CRISIS AND THE CRUMBLING OF THE SOVIET BLOC

In the view of both the KGB and the Soviet Politburo, the Gdańsk Agreement represented the greatest potential threat to the “Socialist Commonwealth” (the official designation of the Soviet Bloc) since the Prague Spring of 1968. On September 3, 1980 the Politburo agreed a series of “theses for discussion with representatives of the Polish leadership”—a euphemism for demands that the Poles recover the ground lost to Solidarity:

The [Gdańsk] agreement, in essence, signifies the legalization of the anti-Socialist opposition… The problem now is how to prepare a counter-attack and reclaim the positions that have been lost among the working class and the people… It is necessary to give overriding significance to the consolidation of the leading role of the Party in society.¹

The principal scapegoat for the success of Solidarity was Edward Gierek, the Polish first secretary, bitterly criticized by the Soviet ambassador, Aristov, among others, for the loss of Party control.² The strikers at the Lenin shipyard had greeted Gierek’s television appearances with derisive catcalls. Ordinary Poles summed up their feelings in one of the political jokes with which they privately mocked their Communist leaders:

QUESTION: What is the difference between Gierek and Gomułka [who had been forced to resign as first secretary in 1970]?

ANSWER: None, only Gierek doesn’t realize it yet!³

On September 5 Gierek was succeeded by Stanisław Kania, the tough, heavily built and heavy-drinking Party secretary responsible for national security. The KGB in Warsaw reported a satirical comment on the changeover doing the rounds in Poland—“Better Kania than Vanya!” (better, in other words, to put up with an unpopular Polish Communist than have to face a Soviet invasion).⁴ It also reported that on September 6 Admiral L. Janczyszyn, the commander-in-chief of the Polish navy, had warned two Soviet admirals that military intervention would end not in “normalization,” as in Prague in 1968, but in catastrophe. “If outside troops are brought into Poland,” he told them, “there would be a river of blood. You must understand that you’re dealing with Poles—not Czechs!”⁵

On September 18 Pavlov, the head of the KGB mission in Warsaw, complained to the Centre that the Kania regime was already repeating the mistakes of its predecessors—looking for compromise with the opposition rather than taking a firm stand against them. The Party rank and file remained demoralized.⁶ “The counter-revolution in Poland is in full flood!” Brezhnev dramatically announced to the Politburo on October 29: