The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB

Jaruzelski was gloomy about the prospects for martial law without Soviet military support. “We’re about to go on the offensive,” he told Milewski, “but I’m afraid that later on we’ll be branded as conspirators and hanged.” Milewski rang Andropov to report what Jaruzelski had said.⁶²

Until the very last moment Moscow continued to fear that Jaruzelski’s nerve would crack. On December 11 Aristov, Kulikov and Pavlov jointly reported to the Politburo that all the preparations for “operation X” (the enforcement of martial law) had been completed. But:

In view of W. Jaruzelski’s inclination toward vacillation and doubt, we can’t exclude the possibility that, under pressure from the episcopate and other forces, he may refuse to take the final decision and will pursue the line of making concessions and agreements. In the light of the current situation, such a step could prove fatal for the PUWP and for the future of Socialism in Poland.⁶³

On Saturday December 12 Jaruzelski telephoned Brezhnev and Suslov, asked for and received their approval for operation X to begin that evening.⁶⁴ The KGB mission in Warsaw, however, was still not convinced that Jaruzelski would go ahead. He continued to agonize over whether the loss of life which might be necessary to prevent Solidarity turning Poland into “a bourgeois state” could possibly be justified. And if martial law failed, he was convinced that all those responsible for declaring it would be “physically eliminated.” “If we fail,” said Jaruzelski, “there will be nothing left for me to do but to put a bullet in my head.”⁶⁵ Pavlov also reported that if Jaruzelski’s nerve failed, Olszowski was prepared to stage a coup—provided he had the backing of Moscow. Olszowski’s plan of action included the immediate arrest of Solidarity leaders; the prohibition of strikes and protests; the confiscation of food supplies in the countryside; close “economic cooperation” with the Soviet Union; the enforcement of martial law throughout the country; and the sealing of Polish borders.⁶⁶

To Pavlov’s relief, Kiszczak, who was in charge of implementing operation X, appeared much more resolute than Jaruzelski. In the course of Saturday December 12 he provided the KGB with the detailed timetable of the operation. At 11:30 p.m., telephone communications throughout the country would be shut down; all embassies would lose their landline connections; communications abroad would cease; and the borders would be closed. Foreign reporters without permanent accreditation would be expelled. The arrests would begin at midnight. Four thousand two hundred would be detained overnight and another 4,500 placed in “protective custody” on Sunday December 13. Wałęsa would be asked to enter talks with the government and arrested if he refused. In a broadcast at 6 a.m. Jaruzelski would declare martial law and announce the creation of a “Military Council for National Salvation.” In order to keep people at home and off the streets on Sunday, church services would—unusually—be televised. If necessary, Monday December 14 would be declared a public holiday. The security forces had orders to open fire if they encountered serious resistance. But, Kiszczak warned, there was no guarantee of success:

If the operation that we have undertaken fails, if we have to pay with our lives, then the Soviet Union will have to be ready to face a hostile state on its western border, whose leaders will promote nationalism and anti-Sovietism. From the outset they will receive energetic assistance from the imperialist states to an extent sufficient for them to sever all ties with Socialist countries. Poland’s Socialist development would be put into reverse for a long period.⁶⁷