The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB

26. Radzinsky, Stalin, pp. 77-9. It is possible that Stalin’s determination about changing the day of the month as well as the year of his birth in official records may have reflected the fear that Okhrana records contained some reference which had been overlooked to an agent, otherwise identified only by codename, who had his date of birth.

27. On June 11, 1919 the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party stated: “[ We] have noted Comrade Dzerzhinsky’s announcement concerning the necessity of leaving illegal political workers in the areas occupied by the enemy… It is proposed that: (a) An Illegals Operations Department be created in the organizational office…” (vol. 6, ch. 5, part 1, n. 1).

28. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 1 and n. 1; vol. 7, ch. 1.

29. k-27,305.

30. Leggett, The Cheka, appendix C.

31. There is little doubt that The State and Revolution represented Lenin’s innermost convictions. Had it been otherwise, he would scarcely have chosen to publish it in February 1918, at a time when the Cheka was already in existence and it was only too easy for Lenin’s opponents to point to the contradictions between his words and his deeds. Its publication at such a difficult time was an act of faith that the regime’s difficulties were only temporary and that he would live to see the fulfillment of his revolutionary dream.

32. Report from the Cheka of the town and district of Morshansk in the first issue of the Cheka weekly, dated September 22, 1918 (k-9,212).

33. Mitrokhin noted the following report (k-9,210) of an inspection by Cheka headquarters of Cheka operations in Dmitrov in 1918:

Kurenkov, aged 18, operates as the chairman of the Dmitrov town Cheka of Moscow province. All his colleagues are young people, but young people who are competent, battle-tested and who work with energy.

However, the work of the Cheka was carried out in a primitive manner. Searches were carried out without elected observers and without representatives of housing committees being present. Confiscated food stuffs were not handed over to the food department, and inventories were not drawn up.

34. Melgounov, The Red Terror in Russia. Figes, A People’s Tragedy, pp. 646-9. The files for the period noted by Mitrokhin (mostly on foreign intelligence) make only indirect references to the atrocities of the civil war.

35. Speech by Lenin, December 23, 1921; text in Tsvigun et al., V.I. Lenin i VChK, pp. 534f.

36. Brovkin, Behind the Front Lines of the Civil War, p. 424. The Dzerzhinsky Archive is Fond 76 in the All-Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Modern History in Moscow.

37. Volkogonov, Lenin, p. 239.

38. Tsvigun et al (eds.), V.I. Lenin i VChK, no. 198. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 69.

39. Pipes (ed.), The Unknown Lenin, pp. 127-9.

40. vol. 6, ch. 1, part 1, n. 1.

41. Pipes, Russia under the Bolshevik Regime, pp. 416-19.

42. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 99-100; Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, pp. 142-3; West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels, p. 5.

43. Tsvigun et al (eds.), Lenin i VChK, no. 390. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 91-4.

44. West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels, p. 5.

45. Tsvigun et al. (eds.), V.I. Lenin i VChK, no. 437.

46. Brovkin, Behind the Front Lines of the Civil War, pp. 334-56. Leggett, The Cheka, pp. 334-8, 464-6.

47. k-9,87.

48. The first of five foreign intelligence priorities set out in INO instructions of November 28, 1922 was “The exposure on the territory of each state of counter-revolutionary groups who are waging both active and passive activity against the interests of the RSFSR and also against the international revolutionary movement.” vol. 7, ch. 1.

49. Mitrokhin’s handwritten note (k-9,87) makes it difficult to determine whether the date was June 16 or 26. Since Zavarny crossed into Romania on June 15 to negotiate details of Tutyunnik’s return with him, it seems highly unlikely, particularly in view of earlier delays, that this could have taken place as early as June 16. Because CASE 39 was run by the internal departments of the OGPU, the file was kept in the special archival collections of the Second Chief Directorate, to which Mitrokhin did not have access. He was, however, able to note a classified history of the operation which was based on, and quoted, the CASE 39 file.