The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB

55. Though some of his agents believed Maly had been a Catholic priest, his operational file shows that he had only deacon’s orders when he volunteered for the army. West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels, pp. 113-14.

56. Poretsky, Our Own People, pp. 214-15; Cornelissen, De GPOe op de Overtoom, ch. 11.

57. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 211-13, 229-30. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, pp. 199ff.

58. vol. 7, ch. 10, app., item 3.

59. vol. 7, ch. 10, app., item 6.

60. Straight, After Long Silence, pp. 101-3, 120-1. The NKVD officer who met Straight did not identify himself, but Straight’s description of him as stocky and dark-haired identifies him as Deutsch rather than the tall Maly, whose height earned him the nickname “der Lange.”

61. Details of Cairncross’s academic career are in the archives of Glasgow University, Trinity College, Cambridge, and Cambridge University.

62. Trinity Magazine, Easter Term 1935 and Easter Term 1936.

63. Cairncross, The Enigma Spy, p. 42.

64. Colville, The Fringes of Power, p. 30 n.

65. vol. 7, ch. 10, item 1.

66. vol. 7, ch. 10, item 23.

67. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, p. 214. West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels, p. 207.

68. vol. 7, ch. 10, para. 23.

69. Cairncross, The Enigma Spy, pp. 61-2. Cairncross’s account of the sequence of his initiation into the NKVD in successive meetings with Burgess, Klugmann and Deutsch agrees with KGB records both as noted by Mitrokhin and in the documents cited in West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels. The Enigma Spy is, none the less, a textbook case of psychological denial. At almost every stage of his career as a Soviet agent (save for a heroic year at Bletchley Park in 1942-3, when he claims that the intelligence he provided on the eastern front was instrumental in “changing the course of World War Two”), Cairncross seeks to diminish or deny the significance of his role. His version of his career as a Soviet agent, save for the year at Bletchley Park, is comprehensively contradicted by the evidence of the KGB files.

70. West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels, p. 208.

71. Minute by Cairncross, March 23, 1937, PRO FO371/21287 W7016. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 230-1.

72. There are very few references to such documents either in Mitrokhin’s notes or in the material from KGB archives made available by the SVR for West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels.

73. Though there is no positive evidence that this document was provided by Cairncross or Maclean, other sources can be excluded. The Center had recently broken contact with the two other agents who provided it with Foreign Office documents, Francesco Constantini and Captain John King. Since Halifax’s record of his meeting with Hitler was not apparently sent as a telegram, the NKVD copy of it cannot have been obtained by SIGINT. The text of Halifax’s record, together with details of its despatch to the Foreign Office, is published in Medlicott et al., Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, 2nd series, vol. 19, pp. 540-8.

74. Roberts, “The Holy Fox,” p. 70.

75. Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3, pp. 6, 162.

76. Medlicott et al., Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, 2nd series, vol. 19, pp. 540-8; Roberts, “The Holy Fox,” pp. 70-5; Parker, Chamberlain and Appeasement, pp. 98-100.

77. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 216, 232-3.

78. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 233. Borovik, The Philby Files, p. 80.

79. vol. 7, ch. 10, para. 4.

80. Borovik, The Philby Files, pp. 90-2.

81. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 234.

Chapter Five Terror

1. Serge, Memoirs of a Revolutionary, 1901-1941, p. 259.

2. For the text of the “Ryutin platform,” see Izvestia (1989), no. 6; Ogonek (1989), no. 15.

3. Volkogonov, Stalin, p. 212.

4. k-4,198.

5. Volkogonov, Trotsky, p. 343.

6. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, ch. 4.

7. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 171-2; Volkogonov, Trotsky, pp. 334-6. Remarkably, a 1997 SVR official history makes a partial attempt to justify the anti-Trotskyist witch-hunt:

[Trotskyist] criticism, though apparently aimed at Stalin personally, was essentially defamatory of everything Soviet. Largely thanks to the Trotskyists, a phenomenon developed abroad which became known as anti-Sovietism, which for many years hurt the USSR’s domestic and foreign policy pursued at that time, as well as the international workers’ and communists’ movement… The Trotskyists were a fruitful agent base for the [Western] intelligence services.