The Third World War: August 1985

1129 Signal — RED ALERT (air raid warning sounded): ‘President USA has received Soviet warning of immediate nuclear attack on Birmingham Engla… [The charred remains of this log were found in the cellar of the ‘Red Cow’.]

APPENDIX 5: Deployment of Forces and Equipment

Authors’ Note and Acknowledgements

We who have put this book together know very well that the only forecast that can be made with any confidence of the course and outcome of another world war, should there be one, is that nothing will happen exactly as we have shown here. There is the possibility, however, that it could. There is also the very high probability that unless the West does a good deal within the next few years to improve its defences a war with the Warsaw Pact could end in early disaster.

Those who argue for the reduction of defence expenditure in the countries of the West not only seem to live in a land of total make-believe, but they refuse to give the Marxist-Leninists who govern the USSR any credit either for meaning what they say (and have been saying for a long time) or for knowing what they are doing. What they have been saying, and have not ceased to say, is that the capitalist countries of the West are doomed to go down before the inexorable advance of communism, with the Red Army playing a major part in their overthrow. What they have been doing is building up huge armed forces, far greater than what would be necessary, in any conceivable situation, for their own defence, at a cost gravely detrimental to domestic development in the USSR and in a mode essentially offensive.

We have been encouraged by signs around us that among the peoples of the West the point, on the strength of such indications, is beginning to be taken. We have outlined a possible course that improvement to the defences of the West might take, in full awareness that it might take others. We have assumed that enough is done to ensure that, when the Soviet machine travels of its own momentum along a path of miscalculation and mischance towards an attack on NATO, the West, at some cost, is able to survive. It is possible, of course, that enough will not be done. The outcome is then likely to be different. This is not to suggest that a war is bound to happen, or even that it is likely. If, however, there could be no question that, in the event of war, the Warsaw Pact would win, the free countries of the West would be in no position to withstand political pressure from the USSR, which would enjoy the fruits of a military victory without having to fight for it.

We have had invaluable advice from a great variety of sources, including the Ministry of Defence in London, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe, Allied Forces Central Europe, the British Royal Military College of Science, and elsewhere.

We are much indebted to a widely acknowledged expert on the Red Army, Professor John Erickson of Edinburgh University.

We are particularly indebted for advice to General M. Davison (formerly C-in-C USAREUR) and General W. de Puy, both recently retired from the US Army. They have given invaluable help on more than one aspect of our work.

Mr Julian Allason, whose own book on the defence of the United Kingdom against nuclear attack will appear in 1979, and Major J. A. Hibbert, who is much concerned with civil defence, have also been helpful, as have serving officers whose advice has helped to lend realism to our treatment of the fighting.

The events in this book have, on occasion, been presented according to our, the authors’, views rather than according to the advice given to us. Any criticism of the result, therefore, should in no way be directed at those mentioned above. No contributions are signed since strict attribution would not be easy in so co-operative an enterprise.

Sir John Hackett, February 1978