“Well,” said Tovey. “They can either sit in those French ports, or come out to see if they have what it takes to challenge HMS Invincible, and may she live up to her name should that ever be the case. As to our operations against the Atlantic islands, I assume that meets with the Former Naval Person’s approval?”
Churchill agreed that action now was imperative, and with a favorable eye on the Royal Marines and commandos, he pushed for more decisive and timely action soon.
“The Joint Planning Group has argued the “Marines” are that in name only,” said Pound. “Being newly raised units, with no real experience in amphibious landings, they insisted that regular army units should spearhead any major amphibious operation, but Churchill told Keyes to continue building up his amphibious striking force.”
“Well,” said Fraser, “the Admiral continued collecting his “Marines,” in any case, and now he has a pair of “Brigades,” which are also that in name only, as they are each comprised of only two battalions of Royal Marines at this stage.”
“We can augment that force with units under War Office control,” said Pound, “though the Joint Planners still consider our amphibious forces inadequate for any significant operation against Vichy held territory. Remember also that these island outposts are not all French territories, they are held by Spain and Portugal.”
There were political considerations there until that fateful meeting atHendaye that saw Spain defect to the Axis banner. Now Keyes argued his men were well suited to the task of seizing these islands, and he eventually won out with the fall of Gibraltar.
The loss of Britain’s Rock had been a hard blow, but one that galvanized planners to look for an alternative place to base Force H. It was determined that this force had to maintain a watch on the West African coast, and operate as a counterfoil to the French Force De Raid based out of Casablanca and Dakar. While no single harbor could match the facilities and capacity they once enjoyed at Gibraltar, the combined facilities available in the island outposts would allow sufficient force to be kept in theater.
The first target in Britain’s new Atlantic island campaign had been the Azores, an operation that had been mounted at Churchill’s urging even while the fighting was underway at Gibraltar. Led by Captain Christopher Wells aboard HMS Glorious, 1st and 5th battalions, Royal Marines, had been put ashore against no more than a mild diplomatic protest logged by Portugal. It had been far easier than all the hand wringing and discussion that preceded it. Churchill was elated when he got the news that the Black Hole in the Atlantic, the place where Britain had little or no air cover, would now be well patrolled by planes from the airfield at the Azores. Now the question of how to proceed was on the table, with the Canary Islands Operation Puma on one side, and the combined Dakar Cape Verde Islands Operation Shrapnel on the other.
As it happened, the positioning of French Naval assets weighed heavily in the balance of that decision. The first battle off Dakar had convinced the Royal Navy that the French could pose a significant threat to any amphibious operation that they decided to oppose. And yet, in spite of the clear victory of AdmiralPlancon’s force over the covering force for Operation Menace, Darlan had come to the decision that Dakar was too far afield to be adequately patrolled and defended in the long run. In this he was strongly influenced by the Germans.
They pointed out that the garrison would be inadequate against any determined British attack, and it could not be easily or quickly reinforced, being simply too far away from other Vichy held bastions in the region. The nearest friendly force was over 2000 kilometers away in the Division de Marrakesh, and the Germans had showed no interest in reinforcing Dakar for similar reasons. If it were built up to a size that might hold its own in battle, then it could not be easily supplied by sea. When the invasion plan was launched, OKW pointed out that the entire Force De Raid would have to be based there to have any chance of stopping it, leaving the better facilities at Casablanca vulnerable.
In the end, Dakar was seen as an outpost that would have to rely on the French Navy for its defense, and Darlan was inclined to position his fighting ships farther north to defend Casablanca. It was a strange logic, for the British planners had already determined that they simply did not have the force to consider an amphibious landing against Casablanca, but they saw the presence of heavy French naval units at Dakar as a most dangerous threat that simply had to be eliminated.