Tiger Heat: German Panzers on the Eastern Front

The Battle of Kursk (July 4 – July 20, 1943) was a decisive battle on the Eastern Front. The battle was an attempt by the Germans to get on the offensive after the major defeat at the Battle of Stalingrad. The Soviet counterpart, however, had good intelligence about the German preparations. The Red Army established deep defensive positions and gathered large forces in reserve. The Battle of Kursk was one of the greatest armoured battles in history that led to the largest loss in a single day. The famous tank crew at Prokhorovka was part of the Battle of Kursk. The German forces were unable to break through the Soviet lines, and eventually the Soviet forces counterattacked. The German side named the battle as Operation Citadel, while the Soviet side, had two names for it – Operation Kutuzov for the defensive and Operation Polkovodets Rumjantsev for the offensive part.

The Battle of Kursk was the last major German offensive on the Eastern Front, after Kursk the initiative shifted to the Red Army. The Soviet battle plan and its execution was exemplary and is still a subject of study both in historical and military circles. The Battle was a direct continuation of the Battle of Stalingrad. After the Paulus army was successfully encircled, the Soviet command made a serious mistake and failed to surround and eliminate the entire Nazi force on the Don and in the North Caucasus.

Field Marshal Manstein, who had been allowed to get away from the Caucasus, during February to March 1943, inflicted a crushing defeat on Soviet forces, retaking Kharkov and Belgorod. The Germans did not have enough firepower for Kursk, hence the Kursk Bulge, a projection going deep into the German front. Within that bulge, a powerful Soviet force was concentrated, and the Germans were out to get the Soviets in revenge for Stalingrad by encircling and routing them.

After June 1941, the Germans did not prepare any other offensive operation as thoroughly as they did Operation Citadel. Preparations continued for almost four months; the troops received a substantial amount of modern hardware and equipment, including Tiger and Panther tanks, Elefant self-propelled guns, FW-190 fighters, Ju-87 bombers.

Preparations were made amid the utmost secrecy, but that secret was known to everyone. The axis of the upcoming German strike was far too obvious. Soviet intelligence services merely confirmed the German plans. Soviet troops prepared for a counteroffensive operation just as thoroughly. The Soviets had never built such strong, deeply layered defensive installations.

It is a military-science axiom that an attacking force should have at least a 4 to 1 superiority over a defending force. At Kursk, in the summer of 1943, the Germans did not have any superiority at all. The Soviet Central and Voronezh Fronts had a 20 percent to 50 percent superiority over the opposing Centre and South Groups while there was also a whole reserve front – the Steppe Front, making Soviet superiority over the Germans more than twofold. To cap it all, they knew exactly when the German offensive was to begin.

In such conditions, Operation Citadel was a suicide mission for the Germans. It is worth mentioning that Hitler was well aware of that, but the German generals were resolved to take their revenge for the Stalingrad humiliation.

The offensive began on July 5, 1943. In less than a week, an armoured contingent of Tigers, Panthers, and Elefants, escorted by Ju 87s, despite fierce resistance by Soviet forces, breached all three defence lines of the Voronezh Front commanded by Gen Vatutin.

By July 12, the Germans gained operational depth. In order to rectify the situation, which was getting desperate, the Soviet command mounted a counter attack with the assets and forces of the Fifth Guards Tank Army under Gen Rotmistrov.

This would become the historic battle of Prokhorovka. It consisted of several separate smaller battles, the total number of Soviet tanks reaching 660 with the Germans having no more than 420. Due to the number of tans involved, Prokhorovka cannot be regarded as the largest tank battle in war history. Even during the Battle of Kursk there were more wide-ranging engagements, while in late June 1941 over 1,500 tanks on both sides had been involved in a battle in Western Ukraine.

The Soviets lost around 500 vehicles while the Germans lost around 200. With such Soviet losses, it was difficult for the Soviets to claim victory. As Rotmistrov himself recalled later, “when he learned about our losses, Stalin flew into a rage. After all, according to the Supreme High Command plans, the tank army was designed to take part in a counteroffensive, near Kharkov, but now it had to be reconstituted and reinforced.