Управление общим. Эволюция институций коллективного действия

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Ostrom, V. 1982. A Forgotten Tradition: The Constitutional Level of Analysis. In Missing Elements in Political Inquiry: Logic and Levels of Analysis, eds. J. A. Gillespie and D. A. Zinnes, pp. 237-52. Beverly Hills: Sage.

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