War And Peace

Military science, observing in history innumerable instances of armies in which size does not correspond with strength, and in which small numbers defeat large ones, vaguely acknowledges the existence of this unknown multiplier, and tries to locate it. Could it perhaps reside in some geometrical disposition of the troops, or better weaponry, or – the most popular explanation – military genius on the part of the leaders? But none of these attempts to define the multiplier comes up with results that agree with the facts of history.

Yet all you have to do to discover the x factor is repudiate the false view (so gratifying for heroes) that acknowledges the effectiveness of steps taken by the higher authorities during a war.

This x factor is army morale, a greater or lesser willingness to fight and face danger on the part of all the men who make up the army, whether or not they are fighting under leaders of genius, with clubs or guns that fire thirty rounds a minute. Men with the greatest desire to fight always steal the advantage when it comes to fighting. Morale is the factor which, when multiplied by mass, gives you the strength of the force. The intellectual problem is to define and express the significance of this unknown factor, morale.

This problem can be solved, but only when we stop the arbitrary business of ignoring the x factor and concentrating on circumstances in which military strength shows itself (decisions taken by a general, military equipment, etc.) and fully acknowledge the role of this unknown factor, the greater or lesser willingness to fight and face danger. Only then, by expressing the known historical facts in equations and comparing the relative significance of this factor, can we hope to define it.

Imagine a situation in which ten men, battalions or divisions take on and defeat fifteen men, battalions or divisions, killing or capturing everybody while sustaining only four losses themselves; they have lost four to the other side’s fifteen. The ratio, four to fifteen, may be expressed as: 4x = 15y. In other words: x:y = 15:4. This equation may not give us the value of an unknown factor, but it does give the ratio between two unknowns. And by expressing a whole range of historical data (battles, campaigns, periods of war) in equations like these, we can obtain sets of figures that must contain laws, and these laws should be discoverable.

The law of tactics that tells armies to group together for attacking purposes and split up for retreat amounts to nothing more than unwitting confirmation of the truth that the strength of an army depends on the state of its morale. To lead men into action under fire calls for greater discipline (attainable only by grouping together) than is needed for self-defence under attack. But since this rule makes no allowance for troop morale, it constantly turns out to be unreliable, and comes to grief most of all in wars where nationality is at stake and there has been a strong rise or fall in army morale.

According to the laws of tactics, in 1812 the retreating French ought to have defended themselves by splitting up, but no, they huddled together in a crowd because their morale had sunk so low it was only their numbers that kept them going. Conversely, according to the laws of tactics the Russians ought to have attacked en masse, but they didn’t, they broke down into small groups because their morale was so high that individual men could be relied on to attack the French without waiting for orders, and nobody needed to be forced into hardship and danger.

CHAPTER 3

The so-called ‘guerrilla’ war had begun the moment the enemy marched into Smolensk. Before it was officially recognized as such by our government many thousands of enemy soldiers – stragglers caught looting or foraging – had been eliminated by Cossacks and peasants, who killed these men off instinctively, like dogs rounding on a mad stray. Denis Davydov, every inch an intuitive Russian, was the first to realize the value of this terrible weapon as an instrument for annihilating the French with no questions asked about the niceties of the military art, and he must be credited with having taken the first step towards the legitimization of this method of warfare. The first guerrilla detachment, formed on the 24th of August, was Davydov’s; others soon followed. As the campaign went on, more and more such detachments were formed.