War with Russia

“Ideally yes, SACEUR,” replied Williams, “but we have to take account of the inevitable friction of war. During that time the air forces have to neutralize the SAM sites, so they don’t take out the airborne on their way in. And that’s assuming Rasputin has worked.”

“Skip’s right, SACEUR,” interjected McKinlay. “That’s the reality.”

“Got it,” replied Howard. “What happens when the airborne land?”

“The ODA will be followed by a beefed-up air-assault company. One for each of the three Iskander sites. The land component commander has had to make some compromises here: ideally he would want at least a three-to-one advantage over the defenders, which means at least a battalion task force. However, putting a battalion on the ground so close to the enemy is asking for trouble. He’s therefore decided to reduce the air-assault landing force to an extra-strong, reinforced company group, but to give them plenty of air support to keep enemy heads down during their assault on the compound. We’re also confident that the air strikes will be so precise that they will not risk setting off the Iskanders.

“The other issue at Pravdinsk is a minefield, probably anti-personnel only, which the Brit team have identified next to the perimeter wire and is covered by fire from the watchtowers. However, they’ve also identified a route through. Their job, once they’ve marked the LZ, is to guide the air-assault company right to the wire. Once they’re in, they’ll have engineers prep the site for demolition, in case it looks as if the Russians are getting their missiles back on line, or it looks as if we are going to be overrun. While they’re doing that, the ODA will be physically disabling the circuitry inside.”

“And the other sites at Yuzhny and Ozyorsk?” queried Howard.

“Effectively the same concept of operations,” replied Williams. “Although we’ve had good intel from other Forest Brother groups, it hasn’t been to the same level as the Brits have provided. There may be minefields. We just don’t know. If there are, and we’re assuming there are, then we’ll have to clear them. But Pravdinsk is the key to the plan as command and control to the other two sites is routed through there.

“So, once in, they’ll disable the nukes at all the sites. My last point is that they’ll then prepare for follow-up air-assault landings by 82nd Airborne at each site. At Pravdinsk we reckon we can build up a brigade on the ground within around six hours. That is more quickly than the Russians can launch an effective, coordinated, multi-brigade counter-attack. Any immediate and localized counter-attacks we’re confident can be dealt with from the air. When the Russians realize what’s happening and get their act together, they’ll come at us with everything they’ve got. Unless, of course, us seizing the nukes persuades the Kremlin to back off. Which is what we are banking on happening.”

He stopped.

Howard was deep in thought, facing the eternal dilemma of the commander who must make the decision to commit men to battle with all its deadly consequences. He turned to McKinlay. “What do you reckon, Dave? High risk if the Russians counter-attack before we can build up an adequate force on the ground. Even if we do and we send in the ARRC to reinforce them, we’ve got precisely the attritional, conventional, land battle we’re looking to avoid. Besides, I’m not sure the Alliance will hold together if we get stuck into a major punch-up in Kaliningrad.”

“Especially as it’s a battle they did not even know we were going to start, so they can say it’s a battle they never authorized,” McKinlay mused.

“Are you now saying you’re not sure, Dave?”

“No, SACEUR, I’m not saying that. In fact we are only a few hours away from capturing the Russian nuclear batteries. There is no indication the Russians have any idea about what is to hit them. Which means the deception plan is working. Which also means we have a fallback plan, of sorts.”

“What do you mean, Dave?”

“The moment we have their missile bases, the whole strategic picture changes. That’s always been our thinking. And, even if Rasputin does not work, or only works for a short time, then we still have our hands on one hundred Russian nuclear missiles…”

“Sir?” It was Skip Williams.

“Yes?” Howard looked momentarily irritated at the interruption.

“DSACEUR’s right on the money. The ODAs each have a couple of guys who’ve been specially trained on the wiring of the Iskanders and more are going in with the air assault. They reckon that it will take about thirty-plus minutes to turn one missile round and, under our control, to target Russia. Once they’ve sorted out how to do one, the next ones will be far quicker. They plan to get a minimum ten Iskanders in each battery facing the Russians before there is any counter-attack. That really is a potent threat to back off or else.”