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SUMMARY OF EFFECTS INDUCED BY ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE IN THE OCTOBER 1988 ATTACK BY THE SOVIET UNION, AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR RECOVERY

Defense Joint Systems Command

28 April 1991


1.0 OBJECTIVE

This report summarizes studies completed in the last seven months regarding multiple high-altitude nuclear detonations by the Soviet Union on 28 October 1988 over the United States of America. These detonations created powerful electromagnetic energy fields, known as electromagnetic pulse or EMP, which in turn produced widespread damage in both military and civilian enterprises. Data utilized in this report were supplied by the Department of Defense Joint Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Effects; Headquarters, Aerospace Defense Command; and the National Security Agency.

2.0 BACKGROUND OF THE SOVIET ATTACK

The nuclear attack in October 1988 by the Soviet Union against the continental United States was initialized by the detonation of six large weapons in the 8–10 MT range some 200–225 miles above the U.S. Comprehensive studies of the attack and its effects are limited because of critical wartime conditions, though It is believed, according to limited data from intelligence satellites, that as many as 12 large MT weapons were targeted by the Soviets as EMP devices. Only six such weapons actually detonated, however.

Nuclear weapons detonated at such high altitudes produce extraordinary electromagnetic fields, which in turn travel within the atmosphere and then strike the surface of the earth, where they can either severely damage or destroy sensitive electronic devices. A single weapon, detonated at a predetermined altitude, can affect an area of hundreds of thousands of square miles. The purpose of the Soviet attack, therefore, was to “blanket” the United States with preemptive levels of electromagnetic energy designed to destroy or severely cripple communications, data storage and processing, and electronic intelligence/detection capacities. Studies have shown that each detonating weapon apparently produced a peak field in excess of 100,000 volts per meter. Precise data are unavailable, though the energy fields thus produced far exceeded prewar military estimates of theoretical attacks. There were collateral effects on both surface installations and spaceborne intelligence satellites.

The six EMP weapons detonated in a pattern roughly forming two unequal triangles covering both halves of the continent. The effects were most pronounced in the U.S., but Canada, Mexico, and several Central American countries reported effects to one degree or another. There were substantial effects absorbed by both military and civilian populations.

A second attack wave followed, with strikes directed at three large urban centers and selected ICBM/SAC targets in the upper Central states. Recent data suggest that as much as 300 MT of total destructive yield were realized in this second and ultimately final movement. The Western, Southwestern, and Central states were unaffected directly, though it is not known at this time whether this limited attack pattern on the part of the Soviets was the result of retaliatory American counterattacks or equipment failures In Soviet weaponry, or whether it was simply one phase of a larger but uncompleted Soviet attack strategy.

3.0 EMP EFFECTS

3.1 General

EMP forces generate enormously high voltages, which destroy the atomic structures of earthbound or space borne objects containing electronic circuitry. This energy, which lasts only several billionths of a second, is sufficient to ‘burn out’ most circuits such as those utilized by microchips and similar devices.

Consequently, six 9–10 MT Soviet weapons, detonated over 200 miles above the United States, produced a nearly simultaneous energy field that destroyed close to 70 percent of all microelectronics in use by both military and civilian organizations.

Shielding, such as that employed in the late prewar years by both the military and industry, was largely ineffective in coping with blasts and subsequent EMP forces of such magnitude. The two areas most severely affected by the EMP effect, for both the military and civilian populations, were communications and electronic data storage/processing.

Brief summaries of the damage sustained by EMP are described in the following sections.

3.2 Military

3.2.1 Overview

Five broad areas within the military system sustained the most severe damage from EMP-generated effects:

AREAPERCENTAGE OF DAMAGE SUSTAINED
Communications75%
Data storage/processing75
Guidance systems65
Intelligence-gathering systems60
Detection systems, including radar70

3.2.2 Discussion

Overall assessment: Nearly catastrophic at 70-percent level.

The substantial dependence by the military establishment on microelectronics is demonstrated by the severe damage rates cited above. Prewar shielding procedures and methods proved to be largely ineffective. The failure to sufficiently employ “hardened” microchips is only one explanation, however. Although experiments were conducted before the war to measure EMP effects, all experiments failed to consider the massive EMP forces created by large MT weapons geostrategically placed. As demonstrated above, most communications, guidance, and information storage/processing capabilities were destroyed. Continental radar systems were similarly affected and, because of orbital satellite conditions and in-flight aircraft locations, substantial intelligence-gathering capacities were destroyed.

Communication facilities utilizing lasers, buried light fibers, and similar equipment survived relatively unharmed. Guidance systems in ICBMs in hardened silos also survived.

Electronic equipment utilizing non-microelectronic components received little or no damage.

3.2.3 Recovery Projections

Recovery of microelectronic capacities is dependent upon three critical factors: (1) the ability to replace/convert damaged components and systems with stockpiled prewar components/systems; (2) the capacity to replace damaged systems with new systems utilizing imported microelectronic components; and (3) the long-term capacity of the United States to rebuild its microelectronic industries.

Given these three factors, the following projections have been made:

-PERCENTAGE OF RECOVERY IN AREA CAPACITY TO DATEPERCENTAGE OF CAPACITY NONRECOVERABLE
Communications25%45%
Data processing/storage2065
Guidance systems6022
Intelligence-gathering systems1872
Detection systems2440

The “Percentage of Capacity Nonrecoverable” statistics suggest estimated requirements for both imports and internal U.S. rebuilding efforts.

3.3 Civilian

3.3.1 Overview

This study has identified 12 major civilian business/industry/public enterprise areas most affected by EMP-generated effects:

TYPE OF ENTERPRISEPERCENTAGE OF DAMAGE SUSTAINED
Computer/information systems87%
Defense industry57
Electronic/telecommunications73
Financial industry41
Government (all levels)67
Heavy industry31
Manufacturing28
Petrochemical38
Power/utilities57
Service industry39
Transportation60

3.3.2 Discussion

Overall assessment: High-end damage at 50-percent level. The nation’s civilian enterprises were affected almost as significantly as the military, perhaps because of inadequate shielding provisions. Although no precise figure can be calculated, it is believed that over 50 percent of the nation’s civilian microelectronic capacities were destroyed by EMP.

As with the military, the prewar civilian groups, including government, made extensive use of microelectronics, largely in computer applications for information storage and processing, and to a lesser extent in systems for manufacturing, airplane guidance, radio and television communications, and the like.

Unfortunately, because of national defense and reconstruction needs, few prewar surplus components are available and current import allocations are limited. As a consequence, the rate of recovery is lower than that for the military.

3.3.3 Recovery Projections

Projections for civilian recovery are based on factors similar to those outlined in 3.2.3 above. They are as follows:

-PERCENTAGE OF RECOVERY IN AREA CAPACITY TO DATEPERCENTAGE OF CAPACITY NONRECOVERABLE
Computer/information systems24%55%
Defense industry2757
Electronics/telecommunications3772
Financial industry2160
Government (all levels)3245
Heavy industry1540
Manufacturing1557
Petrochemical3946
Power/utilities4237
Service industry1869
Transportation2659

4.0 SUMMARY

Prewar estimates of EMP effects have proven to be vastly understated and to some extent unforeseen. EMP effects are centered on microelectronic components, and all levels of both military and civilian populations were affected. Prewar efforts to shield sensitive systems were, to an unfortunate degree, ineffective. Only large-scale prewar efforts to stockpile critical components have permitted the constrained recovery which has occurred to date. There remains a severe shortage of these components and systems, which only accelerated Allied imports and long-term rebuilding can overcome.

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