Where the Iron Crosses Grow

Manstein assigned a supporting role to Fretter-Pico’s XXX Armeekorps and the Romanians, with the intent of preventing Petrov from transferring any units from Sector I or II to reinforce the fight for Mekenzievy Mountain. Unlike Hansen’s LIV Armeekorps, Fretter-Pico had to make do with significantly less air and artillery support, and Manstein made it clear that he would get no reinforcements. Fretter-Pico had taken over XXX Armeekorps just after the culmination of the December 1941 offensive and had not yet commanded a multi-division offensive. Now he would command three infantry divisions: General der Infanterie Johann Sinnhuber’s 28. leichte-Infanterie-Division, Generalleutnant Philipp Müller-Gebhard 72. Infanterie-Division, and Generalleutnant Erwin Sander’s 170. Infanterie-Division. In addition to Fretter-Pico, two of his three infantry division commanders (Sinnhuber and Sander) were career artillery officers and relatively new to maneuvering infantry on a battlefield. By nature, artillerymen are very by-the-book and checklist oriented, rather than the risk-taking style of a born maneuver soldier, and this attitude was very evident in the methodical manner that XXX Armeekorps fought its battle.

While Manstein had not allowed the Romanians to play much of a role in his first two attempts to take Sevastopol, he was now forced to include General-Major Gheorghe Avramescu’s Mountain Corps in Störfang. Avramescu had been working with AOK 11 since the beginning of Barbarossa and was well acquainted both with German operational methods and arrogance. He knew that the Germans were quick to blame the Romanians for any mistakes and to treat their troops in a condescending manner. Yet in order for Hansen’s LIV Armeekorps to mass AOK 11’s best forces against Sectors III and IV, and for Fretter-Pico to mass his lesser forces against Sector I, the Romanians would have to deal with Sector II with only limited German help. Avramescu’s corps was a mixed bag: the 1st Mountain Division was a good unit, well suited to the terrain and mission, and the Corps artillery was quite good by Crimean standards. The Romanian mountain-infantry battalions had proven themselves to be aggressive and reliable in the December fighting, and were capable of capturing fortified positions if decently supported. On the other hand, Avramescu’s other formation – the 18th Infantry Division – had negligible combat experience, and its reservist infantrymen were better suited for static defensive missions. The 4th Mountain Division was still dealing with remaining pockets of resistance from the Sudak landing and partisans, but would be sent to join Avramescu’s corps in mid-June.

Fretter-Pico’s main opponent was General-Major Petr G. Novikov, commander of the 109th Rifle Division and the SOR’s Sector I, which ran from Balaklava to the Yalta–Sevastopol road, north of Kamary. Novikov was no rookie: he had commanded an infantry battalion in the Spanish Civil War, a rifle regiment in the Russo-Finnish War, and then a rifle division during Barbarossa. His 109th Rifle Division had been formed in Sevastopol in January 1942 from remnants of the 2nd Cavalry Division, NKVD border troops, and reservists. All three of his rifle regiments were in the front line and holding the high ground that blocked German entry into Balaklava. Colonel Nikolai A. Shvarev’s 388th Rifle Division had two regiments protecting the sector around the destroyed village of Kamary, while his 782nd Rifle Regiment was in reserve on the Sapun Heights. Like Novikov, Shvarev was an experienced veteran, having been an NCO in the Tsarist Army during 1915–17, then having joined the Red Guards after the Bolshevik Revolution. During the Russo-Finnish War, he commanded a rifle regiment involved in breaching the Mannerheim Line. The 388th Rifle Division was a typical Caucasian outfit, with its Armenian, Azeri, and Georgian troops organized in segregated companies with Russian officers. Novikov was essentially a rifle-corps commander, but he did not have the resources of a corps commander. His artillery support was limited to two artillery regiments with 27 guns (eight 152mm, six 122mm, and 13 76.2mm), along with some help from Morgunov’s local batteries. Blagoveshchensky’s 9th Naval Infantry Brigade was assigned as a reserve for Novikov’s sector, but most of its battalions were deployed in coastal-defense duties, due to Petrov’s fear that the Germans would attempt an amphibious landing to get behind Balaklava.