Where the Iron Crosses Grow

When Operation Brunhild began on September 12, Jaenecke lost control over parts of AOK 17 as it was transported from the Kuban to the Crimea. XXXXIV Armeekorps was the first major formation to be transported to the Crimea, where the OKH immediately transferred it to AOK 6 to reinforce its crumbling front. As more divisions were evacuated from the Kuban, they kept getting transported to other threatened sectors in Ukraine, until finally, eight of the ten German divisions in AOK 17 were transferred to other commands. In the Crimea, Jaenecke’s AOK 17 was left with just the 50. and 98. Infanterie-Divisionen and six Romanian divisions. Even those units were incomplete; Major Erich Bärenfänger’s Grenadier-Regiment 123 was detached from the 50. Infanterie-Division and sent by truck across the Chongar bridge to reinforce XXXXIV Armeekorps at Mariupol. In small compensation, AOK 6 transferred Generalmajor Wilhelm Kunze’s worn-out 336. Infanterie-Division to AOK 17 for rebuilding in the Crimea, but it had only four battalions and almost no artillery.[2] Of the seven Romanian divisions subordinate to AOK 17, the three mountain divisions were in decent shape in terms of personnel and equipment, but the Germans no longer put much faith in the Romanians to fulfill any but the most basic missions after the defeat at Stalingrad. In addition, the Befehlshaber Krim contributed the 153. Feldausbildungs-Division and the 1st Slovakian Infantry Division, both of which had minimal combat capabilities. By late October 1943, there were over 200,000 Axis military personnel in the Crimea, but only about one-fifth of these were combat troops. Over 27,000 personnel were assigned to quartermaster and logistic units, Fliegerkorps I had over 5,000 Luftwaffe personnel and the Kriegsmarine had over 4,000 in the Crimea. In addition, the SS, SD, and Abwehr still had a very strong presence in the Crimea, with over 6,000 assigned personnel, but their military effectiveness was negligible.

Jaenecke had only just settled into his new headquarters in Simferopol when the entire situation around him spun out of control. AOK 6, including the recently arrived XXXXIV Armeekorps, was badly defeated at Melitopol by General Fyodor I. Tolbukhin’s 4th Ukranian Front on October 24 and began to retreat toward the lower Dnepr. Tolbukhin let loose his armor and cavalry in pursuit – the 11th and 19th Tank Corps and the 4th Guards Cavalry Corps – which came rolling across the barren Nogai Steppe at great speed. It was quickly apparent that the Soviets would make for the traditional entrances to the Crimea – Perekop and the Chongar Narrows – to isolate AOK 17. Amazingly, the only Axis forces near Perekop was a battlegroup of the 1st Slovak Division and a few replacement battalions from Generalmajor Kurt Gerock’s 153. Feldausbildungs-Division, while the Chongar Narrows were virtually unguarded.[3] For once, it was the Wehrmacht caught with its pants down, with the entrances to the Crimea wide open.

Axis command and control in the Crimea was in a muddle in the last days of October 1943. Jaenecke controlled General der Gebirgstruppe Rudolf Konrad’s XXXXIX Gebirgs-Korps, but Konrad had no troops near Perekop or Chongar, which were still designated “Rear Areas” under control of the Befehlshaber Krim. Generalleutnant Friederich Köchling, an experienced infantryman, arrived from Berlin to take over the Befehlshaber Krim just two weeks before the Soviets arrived at the approaches to the Crimea. The command relationship between Jaenecke and Köchling was rather fuzzy, with each controlling some of the troops in the Crimea – a clear violation of the principle of unity of command. There were also separate Romanian, Kriegsmarine, and Luftwaffe chains of command, with no clear senior authority (this same phenomenon of poor inter-service coordination and inter-allied relations had plagued the Wehrmacht in North Africa as well). Köchling was observant enough to notice the threat to Perekop and Chongar and he agreed to move his available units, meager though they were, into blocking positions. Jaenecke displayed no sense or urgency at all and openly talked about a plan named “Michael” that his staff had prepared for evacuating AOK 17 from the Crimea, even though this was not authorized.[4] In fact, Hitler expressly forbade evacuation on October 28.[5] Yet Hitler did not bother consulting with the Romanian dictator Ion Antonescu about his opinion of keeping seven Romanian divisions isolated in the Crimea. By chance, elements of Kunze’s 336. Infanterie-Division were not too far from the northern coast of the Crimea and Jaenecke acquiesced to it establishing a few blocking positions, but he was slow to order either the 50. Infanterie-Division or the two Romanian corps to detach any reinforcements. Jaenecke was looking to exit the Crimea, not defend it.