Where the Iron Crosses Grow

“The Judaeo-Bolshevik system should be destroyed once and for all, so that it never threatens our vital European space … the [German] soldier should understand the necessity of punishing the Jews – the carriers of the very spirit of Bolshevik Terror.”

Erich von Manstein, Top Secret Directive to AOK 11, November 20, 1941

The Wehrmacht did not come to the Crimea to liberate its population, but to take control over a region that was regarded as having strategic, military, and economic value, and then exploit it for the benefit of the Third Reich. Hitler was particularly adamant that those members of the local population who were designated enemies of the Third Reich – Jews, Gypsies, communists, and “uncooperative Slavs” – would be eliminated, while the survivors would be put to work repairing war damage and paving the way for German colonization of the Crimea. Generalplan Ost, the master plan for ethnic cleansing in the Soviet Union, envisioned the elimination of two-thirds of the Ukrainian population within a few decades after a German victory and their replacement by Volksdeutsche colonists. Hitler envisioned the Crimea as eventually being transformed into “Gotengau”: a Germans-only Black Sea resort, with autobahns being built by forced labor to provide access for German tourists in a future post-war world. There was no room in this exalted vision of the Crimea for non-Germans, so their removal became an important prerequisite to realize Hitler’s dream.

As AOK 11 moved into the Crimea in November 1941, it was followed by SS-Gruppenführer Otto Ohlendorf’s Einsatzgruppe D. This 600-man unit (not including local auxiliaries) was already responsible for the murder of over 40,000 civilians in Ukraine during the first four months of Operation Barbarossa. Although some German sources have attempted to portray Einsatzgruppe activity as unrelated to Wehrmacht operations, Einsatzgruppe D was attached directly to AOK 11 and was dependent upon it for logistical support. The Korück 553 (Commander Army Rear Areas) under Generalleutnant Heinrich Döhla, which was established to operate the logistical network behind Manstein’s AOK 11 in the Crimea, regularly provided resources to Einsatzgruppe D. Furthermore, Manstein issued his top secret directive to AOK 11’s senior leadership on November 20, 1941, which identified Jews and Bolsheviks as one and the same and directed his troops to cooperate with repressive measures. Ohlendorf also met with Manstein and his staff frequently, both for coordination purposes and social reasons – Ohlendorf and Manstein both enjoyed playing bridge. There was also a certain amount of horse-trading between the Wehrmacht and the SS: Ohlendorf would ask Manstein for trucks and ammunition to support his “special actions,” while Manstein asked Ohlendorf to provide AOK 11 with winter clothing and wristwatches from the victims.

When the Germans first entered the Crimea, the region’s population numbered just under one million, of which roughly 65,000–85,000 were considered Jews under Nazi legal statutes.¹ There were two small sub-groups, the Krymchaks (whom the SS regarded as Jews) and the Karaites (whom the SS designated as non-Jews), who had adopted elements of Tatar language and customs. Initially, Ohlendorf had to send half his small unit to support Kleist’s push towards Rostov, and entered the Crimea with two company-size Sonderkommandos. He set up his group command post in Simferopol, not far from Manstein’s headquarters, just two weeks after AOK 11 occupied the city. Given the small numbers of personnel he had at his disposal, he spent the first week gathering information about the Jewish population and communist sympathizers in the Crimea. Ohlendorf was quick to note in his regular reports to Berlin that the local Tatars were “positively inclined towards the German occupying forces” and willing to provide information about the Reich’s enemies. It was at this point that the memory of OZET and the Red Terror hung like a noose about the neck of the Jewish community in the Crimea.