Where the Iron Crosses Grow

Between November 1943 and March 1944, AOK 17 suffered 21,970 casualties, including 6,077 dead or missing, but was receiving a monthly average of about 3,500 replacements. In February 1944, Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 279 was brought in by sea, doubling the anti-armor capability of AOK 17. In mid-March, the Kriegsmarine was even able to transfer large elements from the 73. and 111. Infanterie-Divisionen from Odessa to the Crimea, to reinforce AOK 17; both units were battered and understrength. The 111. Infanterie-Division deployed a 5,000-man group to the Crimea by MFP and air transport, but suffered a painful loss when an Me-323 loaded with an 80-man artillery battery crashed, killing everyone aboard. The OKH directed Jaenecke to restructure all five of his German infantry divisions according to the revised 1944 table of organization (which included 1,181 Hiwis in the structure), but none of his divisions were even close to the standard. His strongest unit, Generalleutnant Friedrich Sixt’s 50. Infanterie-Division, had only four of its own infantry battalions, plus four replacement battalions (FEB), two Slovak battalions, two Bergmann battalions made of Caucasian troops, and two German battalions from other commands. Sixt’s artillery regiment had all its 10.5cm l.FH 18 howitzers, but only three of its 15cm s.FH 18 howitzers.¹⁹ The 336. Infanterie-Division was in even worse shape, with only three of its own infantry battalions and six Romanian battalions attached directly to it. Large numbers of Hiwis and Tatars were also incorporated into German units. Aside from relying heavily upon captured or local troops, the quality of most German replacements by this point in the war was problematic, and replacing a junior infantryman was one thing, but replacing veteran NCOs and junior officers was quite another. Jaenecke was also forced to employ odd formations like Landesschützen-Bataillon 876 and the Kriegsmarine’s Marine-Infanterie-Bataillon Klüver, which lacked the equipment or training to go toe-to-toe with the Red Army. Once the Wehrmacht lost its advantage in combat-experienced junior leaders, its ability to withstand the Red Army’s hammer blows was forfeit.

However, not all the replacements flown into the Crimea were inexperienced. Some veterans who had been evacuated earlier for wounds voluntarily opted to return to their units in the Crimea, even though they had opportunities to be re-assigned elsewhere. Hauptmann Karl-Otto Leukefeld, who had been awarded the Ritterkreuz for his accomplishments as a company commander with the 50. Infanterie-Division during the fighting at Sevastopol in the winter of 1941/42, had been assigned to instructor duty in France after he recovered from wounds. Yet in March 1944 he requested to return to his old regiment in the Crimea. He was flown in and took command of I./Grenadier-Regiment 123 in reserve near Perekop. The German concept of Kameradschaft, or comradeship, was a key factor that held units together under the stressful combat conditions on the Eastern Front. Regimental identity and loyalty remained strong among officers and NCOs, serving as a combat multiplier as long as trusted leaders remained. Although the Red Army had many brave soldiers, regimental-level political commissars ensured that loyalties were reserved for Stalin, the Communist Party, or the Rodina, not military leaders or organizations – that kind of loyalty was considered dangerous in the Soviet Union.