The German divisions held the narrow neck of the Chersonese Peninsula as long as they could, but were under constant attack. Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 191 still had eight operational StuG III assault guns that made it to the Chersonese, but they were the target of constant air and artillery attacks. Meanwhile, the Soviets were already rejoicing in the liberation of Sevastopol and Marshal Aleksandr Vasilevsky, who had coordinated operations between Tolbukhin’s 4th Ukrainian Front and the Coastal Army, was eager to tour the shattered city. However, Sevastopol was still littered with unexploded ordnance, and as Vasilevsky’s staff car moved down the road across Mekenzievy Mountain on May 10 he had the ill luck of driving over a German mine.14
Marshal Vasilvesky was wounded and evacuated to Moscow for military treatment – not an auspicious start to the liberation. However, the German troops isolated on the Chersonese Peninsula were unaware that they had succeeded in wounding a Soviet marshal and were instead focused on their fight to survive until they could be evacuated.The Axis defense began to crumble late on May 11, as Tolbukhin’s forces launched attack after attack. Some Romanian mountain troops were still in the fight, but the bulk of the 3rd Mountain Division had already been evacuated. By 2300hrs, all units were ordered to retreat to pre-designated embarkation points. However, this signal resulted in a disorderly race for the boats, and order and discipline began to collapse even in German units. The Soviet 19th Tank Corps was hard on the heels of the retreating Axis units, followed by the 383rd Rifle Division and 32nd Guards Rifle Division. Generalmajor Alfred Reinhardt, leading the remnants of his 98. Infanterie-Division, managed to load all his troops in an ordered manner by 0300hrs on May 12 and get away, but other units were less fortunate. In any evacuation operation, troops fear being forgotten or left behind. At this critical moment, Konteradmiral Schulz, who was operating from an S-Boat offshore, suffered communications problems that interfered with his ability to direct shipping to the right embarkation point at the right time. Insufficient transports arrived to pick up either the 50. or 336. Infanterie-Divisionen, and none at all for the 111. Infanterie-Division. Only about 2,800 troops from the 50. Infanterie-Division, including Hauptmann Walter Salzmann, commander of Füsilier-Bataillon 50, managed to escape. A 2,756-man Romanian detachment, with five mountain battalions from the 1st and 2nd Mountain Divisions, was also left behind. Some transports returned empty to Constanta, having failed to find the correct embarkation beaches. The remaining troops were left with their backs to the sea, often in tactically indefensible positions. Some officers committed suicide rather than face capture, while others tried to disguise themselves as enlisted men. On the morning of May 12 the Soviets rushed into the Chersonese Peninsula with tanks and infantry, crushing resistance nests. By 0945hrs, a large concentration of Axis troops was surrounded at the airstrip by the 19th Tank Corps. Flushed with victory, many Soviet troops shot surrendering German troops out of hand. Thousands of Germans and Romanian troops were captured, but the exact numbers are uncertain.
Generalmajor Erich Grüner, who had distinguished himself as a regimental commander during the second battle of Kharkov in May 1942, led the final stand of the abandoned 111. Infanterie-Division. When Soviet T-34s began overrunning his positions at the water’s edge, he stood up and died on his feet, with his