Where the Iron Crosses Grow

On the same day as Schobert’s death, SS-Sturmbannführer Kurt Meyer’s Aufklärungs-Abteilung LSSAH from the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler (LSSAH) division approached Perekop after a 35-mile dash from the Berislav bridgehead. Oberstleutnant Oskar von Boddien’s Aufklärungs-Abteilung 22 was close behind, and together these two reconnaissance units reached the village of Preobrazhenka, 5 miles north of the Tatar Wall, at around 0600hrs. Meyer had a mixed reconnaissance group of Kradschützen (motorcycle infantry), a few armored cars, and a Panzerjäger platoon with 3.7cm antitank guns, but no artillery or engineers. Upon entering the village, his lead company was fired upon by 76mm guns from the Soviet armored train Voykovets and engaged by small-arms fire from dug-in Soviet infantrymen. 2nd Battalion/361st Rifle Regiment from Danilin’s 156th Rifle Division was entrenched in a strongpoint in the nearby Chervonyi Chaban State Farm. In addition to this strongpoint, Meyer could see that the area further south around Perekop was heavily fortified with bunkers and barbed wire. He beat a hasty retreat under cover of smoke and reported back to LIV Armeekorps that, “coup against Perekop impossible.”⁹

CHAPTER 3 Across the Tatar Wall, September 1941

“…and I will show you where the Iron Crosses grow….”

Feldwebel Rolf Steiner, The Cross of Iron

(1977)

When Manstein arrived at Nikolayev on September 17 to take command of the 11. Armee (AOK 11), he found that the bulk of his forces were advancing toward Melitopol while Hansen’s LIV Armeekorps had moved its 46. and 73. Infanterie-Divisionen up near Perekop but had taken no action to reduce the Soviet defenses. XXX Armeekorps had sealed off the Chongar Peninsula and Arabat Spit with the LSSAH Division, but also had made no effort to penetrate into the Crimea. Schobert’s death had given Kuznetsov a vital breathing space in which to enhance his defenses. The difficulty of moving supplies across the Dnepr, with all bridges down, also made it difficult for the 11. Armee to mount a hasty assault at Perekop, since LIV Armeekorps was short of fuel and artillery ammunition.

Danilin’s 156th Rifle Division built three lines of defense across the Perekop Isthmus, with the main line of resistance centered upon the Tatar Wall. The outer line of defense consisted of two rifle battalions deployed in forward strongpoints, each supported by an artillery battalion. Colonel Vladimir P. Shurygin, the 51st Army’s senior engineer, used civilian labor to dig a 6ft-deep antitank ditch behind this outer covering force, and emplace four lines of tanglefoot-type barbed-wire obstacles. Shurygin’s engineers built concrete and timber/stone bunkers for 76mm cannon and 45mm antitank guns in the main line of resistance, as well as digging in several tanks. The Tatar Wall itself was fronted by the ancient moat, which was now 36ft deep and 104ft wide; the wall sat atop a 15ft-high earth berm. The area was completely open, without trees or vegetation, and the Soviets could observe every move that the Germans made. However, the most frightening aspect of the Perekop defenses for the Germans was the extensive use of antipersonnel mines; up to this point in the war the Wehrmacht had not yet had to penetrate a defense of this kind. Not only did Shurygin’s engineers emplace thousands of PMD wooden antipersonnel mines, but they buried 50kg aerial bombs and even large naval mines from the depots at Sevastopol. Another innovation was the use of buried flamethrowers with trip wires. Indeed, Kuznetsov got a bit carried away in sending materiel to reinforce the Perekop defenses, including some mines filled with mustard gas; when the Stavka learned of this, Kuznetsov was rebuked and told not to employ chemical weapons without permission.¹