Where the Iron Crosses Grow

Amazingly, Manstein does not even mention his first assault upon Sevastopol in his memoirs, indicating his tendency to skip over unpleasant events. Once Hansen’s pursuit ground to a halt against Sevastopol’s defenses, it was clear to Manstein that he would have to mount either a siege or a full-scale assault in order to take the city. Characteristically, he opted for the more decisive choice of an assault. However, AOK 11 was in no shape for a full-scale assault upon Sevastopol in mid-November. Since crossing the Dnepr River two months earlier, it had suffered over 26,000 casualties (including 5,400 dead or missing) out of a total strength of 295,000, and fought three major battles. Artillery ammunition was in short supply after the fighting on the Perekop Isthmus and it would take weeks to replenish it by truck convoys from the Dnepr. The 132. Infanterie-Division, which was the closest unit to Sevastopol, only had half of a basic load of ammunition for its 10.5cm l.FH 18 howitzers and four-fifths of a load for its 15cm s.FH 18 howitzers on November 8 – barely sufficient to support one or two days of attacking.⁴ Furthermore, AOK 11 was spread across the Crimea, with four of seven German infantry divisions still fully involved at Kerch. At best, Hansen could begin the assault with his LIV Armeekorps (the 50. and 132. Infanterie-Divisionen) with Salmuth’s XXX Armeekorps joining in with the 22. and 72. Infanterie-Divisionen within a few days. Manstein assumed that he would be able to get at least two divisions from XXXXII Armeekorps into action at Sevastopol before the end of November, leaving the Romanian forces to conduct mop-up operations in the rest of the Crimea.

However, Manstein’s assumptions proved wishful thinking, as the fighting at Kerch lasted longer than expected and Heeresgruppe Süd directed that two of Sponeck’s three divisions would go to reinforce Kleist’s advance rather than support the attack on Sevastopol. After regrouping his two divisions, Hansen began small-scale probing attacks against the boundary between the SOR’s II and III Defensive Sectors on November 11, trying to detect and neutralize Kolomiets’ forward security screen. On November 12, the 132. Infanterie-Division finally made a determined effort, with elements of four of its infantry battalions attacking a hill outpost held by the 31st Rifle Regiment, but the attack lacked significant air or artillery support and failed. The next day it was the 50. Infanterie-Division’s turn to attack with a few battalions, which also failed to make it through the Soviet forward security screen. Petrov was surprised at how puny Hansen’s infantry assaults were, with battalions at half-strength, and saw a chance to knock AOK 11’s offensive off balance. Temperatures were already falling to 10°F (-12°C), which further reduced any remaining zest for combat in Hansen’s exhausted men, when Petrov struck the front of LIV Armeekorps with a massive but uncoordinated counteroffensive on the morning of November 14. The 7th and 8th Naval Infantry Brigades formed the core of the attacking force, supplemented by three other naval infantry regiments and two Red Army rifle regiments – it was primarily a naval affair. The 132. Infanterie-Division was particularly hard hit by the Soviet naval infantrymen, who attacked in waves and managed to push the German frontline units back. Although Petrov’s counteroffensive did not recapture much ground, it forced Hansen’s corps onto the defensive for the remainder of November. The only positive note for LIV Armeekorps was that several dozen bunkers had been overrun, which would provide useful winter siege quarters for the frontline German troops. Yet aside from some aggressive patrolling and raids by the 22. Infanterie-Division, which finally got into line north of Duvankoi, Hansen’s role in the first offensive was over.