Where the Iron Crosses Grow

Generalleutnant Kurt Himer had taken command of the 46. Infanterie-Division only nine days prior to the Soviet amphibious assault. By 0610hrs he was aware of several landings, but the disjointed nature of the Soviet plan made it difficult for him to assess the enemy’s main effort. Oberst Ernst Maisel’s IR 42 appeared to have repulsed the landings south of Kerch, but the landings to the north were largely unopposed. Himer ordered Oberst Friedrich Schmidt’s IR 72 to crush the landings at Cape Khroni, but there were no forces near Bulganak Bay or Cape Zyuk. After considering more reports on enemy activity, Himer ordered the Stabskompanie (headquarters company) of Oberstleutnant Alexander von Bentheim’s IR 97 and its alarm unit – Hauptmann Karl Bock’s III./IR 97 – plus a battery of 10.5cm howitzers, to rush toward Cape Zyuk. Bentheim’s regiment was the most spread out of Himer’s regiments, with II./IR 97 in Feodosiya and the other two battalions in central reserve. The roads were in bad condition due to heavy rain but Bentheim moved out with a horse-mounted platoon, and the lead elements of his regiment crawled eastward along the northern coast of the Kerch Peninsula toward Cape Zyuk. By midnight, Bentheim had both his I. and III. Battalions, along with two batteries of artillery, moving into position for a counterattack the next day.⁵

Kurt Himer had few forces available and was compelled to deal with multiple dispersed enemy landings and insufficient information on which to base his command decisions. At 1350hrs, IR 72 reported that they had captured a Soviet officer in skirmishing near Cape Khroni, and that under interrogation he had revealed that the Soviets intended to land a total of 25,000 troops near Kerch. With only six battalions to defend the entire eastern Kerch Peninsula, Himer – with Sponeck’s approval – began making decisions that would shape the battle. He decided to commit all of IR 72 to crush the Cape Khroni landing as quickly as possible and bring up all of IR 97 – including II./IR 97 in Feodosiya – to crush the Cape Zyuk landings. He directed IR 42 to contain the Kamysh Burun landings until the other counterattacks were completed. A small alarm unit known as Eingreifgruppe Bulganak, consisting of one rifle company from IR 72, an artillery battery, and some pioneers, was sent to contain the landings at Bulganak Bay. Meanwhile, Sponeck requested that the Romanian 8th Cavalry Brigade be dispatched to reinforce Himer’s forces near Kerch. It was a typical German operational plan: decisive, expeditious, and based upon a faulty intelligence picture.

Due to the muddy roads, the two battalions from Bentheim’s IR 97 were not in a position to counterattack the Soviet beachhead at Cape Zyuk until 1300hrs on December 27. The terrain near the Soviet beachhead was flat and devoid of any vegetation, offering no concealment to either side. The Soviet troops – members of the 2nd Battalion/83rd Naval Infantry Brigade – spotted the Germans and immediately launched a spoiling attack against Hauptmann Karl Bock’s III./IR 97 as it was deploying, committing three T-26 tanks and several companies of infantry. The Germans were briefly knocked off balance but a Panzerjäger platoon from 14./IR 97 was able to deploy a 3.7cm Pak, and Obergefreiter Max Freyberger fired 42 rounds into the attacking Soviet tanks, knocking all three out. A few Luftwaffe aircraft also arrived overhead and bombed the Soviet infantry, who fell back to their beachhead, but the German counterattack was postponed until the next day. Both sides hunkered down for the night on the open terrain, with a strong, cold wind chilling the troops.

At dawn on December 28, a cloudy day with light frost, the two battalions of IR 97 converged on the Soviet beachhead from the southwest, supported by two 10.5cm howitzers from 3./AR 114, while a pioneer company blocked the eastern exits from the beach. The Soviet landing force was in an indefensible position, crammed between the coast and Lake Chokraks’k, which made any defense difficult. Around 1000hrs, a few Stukas from StG 77 and six He-111 bombers arrived to bomb the Soviet beachhead.⁶ Hauptmann Karl Bock’s battalion quickly smashed through the Soviet defenses and headed toward the beach. The 42-year-old Bock was an unusual battalion commander in the German Army, being both a veteran of World War I and a member of the Nazi Party who had served six years in the SS. By 1200hrs, Bock’s troops had the beach in sight. The Soviets fought from rock outcroppings and then were pushed back further, some troops fighting standing waist-deep in the surf. Yet by late afternoon, Soviet resistance at Cape Zyuk was broken; and IR 97 took 458 prisoners and counted about 300 dead. Bentheim’s regiment suffered roughly 40 casualties in reducing the Soviet beachhead.