On the Soviet side, General-Lieutenant Dmitri T. Kozlov’s Caucasus Front still directed the operations of the 44th and 51st Armies, but he believed that the Germans were too weak to threaten either of these armies before he was ready to make his own “big push.” He violated one of the primary tactical lessons learned during World War I – entrench your forces whenever they stop advancing – and did not emphasize defensive measures. Prior to launching a major offensive, Kozlov also wanted to conduct another landing behind enemy lines on the Black Sea coast in order to divert Manstein’s reserves – a tactic which had already demonstrably failed at Yevpatoriya. On the night of January 5/6, 218 soldiers from the 226th Infantry Regiment were landed from the destroyer
Generalmajor Vasiliy K. Moroz’s 236th Rifle Division had its main line of resistance 9 miles northwest of Feodosiya on the Biyuk–Eget ridge, which towered over the flat plain. He also had a forward security zone, deployed 3 miles forward of the ridge. Moroz was an experienced cavalryman and his division was close to full strength, sitting atop the best terrain in the area. At dawn on January 15, 1942, Manstein’s counteroffensive kicked off with a brief artillery preparation on Moroz’s forward security positions, followed by Stukas and He-111s bombing the ridgeline. Then three battalions of Oberstleutnant Otto Hitzfeld’s IR 213 advanced, along with I. and II./IR 42 from Himer’s division. Hitzfeld was one of the best German regimental commanders in the Crimea and an aggressive tactical leader. Apparently caught by surprise, Moroz’s forward security positions were quickly overrun by Hitzfeld’s soldiers. Three StuG IIIs supported the advance and knocked out two T-26 light tanks, but then one assault gun was knocked out by a Soviet 76.2mm antitank gun.11
During the day, German bombers found Pervushin’s command post and blasted it to pieces; Pervushin was badly wounded and the 44th Army’s command and control was disrupted at a critical moment. His chief of staff, Colonel Serafim E. Rozhdestvensky, took over command, but the situation was too chaotic to make informed decisions. The rest of the 46. Infanterie-Division and the Romanian 8th Cavalry Brigade conducted feint attacks against the 51st Army, which further confused the Russians, who wasted their reserves in this unimportant sector. By evening, Hitzfeld’s infantry had captured virtually the entire Biyuk–Eget ridgeline, and German forward observers could now observe virtually all of the 44th Army’s lodgment. Moroz’s division had been badly defeated in a single day by just five German infantry battalions – a stunning upset from an enemy who had seemed on the ropes. Nevertheless, Fretter-Pico’s corps suffered 500 casualties on the first day of the offensive.12On January 16, Fretter-Pico’s XXX Armeekorps continued to pound against the 44th Army’s faltering defense north of Feodosiya, reinforcing Gruppe Hitzfeld with more battalions from the 46. and 170. Infanterie-Divisionen. The Soviets mistakenly interpreted the German operational objective as seizing the town of Vladislavovka, near the juncture of the 44th and 51st Armies, and committed most of their reserves in this sector, leaving Feodosiya itself poorly protected. The Soviets attempted to assemble a battalion-size armored counterattack to save Vladislavovka but ran straight into the assault guns of Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 190, which knocked out 16 T-26 light tanks.13
Meanwhile, the main German effort steadily pushed the 63rd Mountain Rifle Division back toward the sea and threatened to isolate the 236th Rifle Division in Feodosiya. Since the VVS-ChF was still flying from airfields in the Taman Peninsula, the Luftwaffe was able to operate over Feodosiya with little interference from enemy aircraft. By the evening of January 16, Fretter-Pico brought up the 32. Infanterie-Division to attack directly into Feodosiya.