Many people believed the story, and for once the young man lost his habitual self-possession. “Mad with anger,” he ran to Antony’s house and shouted at the front door that Antony was the plotter, who wanted to ruin Octavian’s popularity with the people. He swore all kinds of oaths and challenged Antony to bring him to court. When no one appeared, he said in desperation: “I agree to be judged by your friends.” With this he tried to go inside, but was stopped. He hurled abuse at the men at the door and, before going away, claimed that if anything happened to him, his death would be due to Antony’s treachery.
The assassination plot was almost certainly an invention, Antony’s attempt at a publicity coup. As Appian noted:
Octavian’s panic-stricken reaction won around public opinion, although a few skeptics suspected that the two men were colluding in some kind of contrivance against their mutual enemies.
As summer gave way to autumn 44 B.C., matters were coming to a head. It would only be three months before new consuls were in place: Hirtius and Pansa, moderate Caesarians who were profoundly irritated by Antony’s clumsy maneuvering to secure his personal position and were aligning themselves cautiously with republicans. They would be entitled to raise troops; once they had done so, the Senate would be able to defend itself militarily, as it had not been able to do so far.
Out of sight but not out of mind, Brutus and Cassius were playing a waiting game. If possible, they wanted to avoid a new civil war, but, should the Republic be at risk, they, too, would recruit an army, with which to save it from its Caesarian enemies, such as Antony and Octavian.
Since his arrival on the scene, Caesar’s teenaged heir had played his hand with cool skill. Young and inexperienced, he had that most essential of political talents, the ability to take good advice. Ruthless and patient, he would do whatever was necessary to the achievement of his goals. However, he was still without an army and without a role. As Julius Caesar’s adopted son, he was hugely popular with the masses, but had not found a way of translating this into tangible power.
VI
FROM VICTORY, DEFEAT
44–43 B.C.
Beneath Antony’s easygoing, affable manner lay a harsh and unforgiving nature. Furious at the men’s attitude, in his speech he blamed them for not bringing Octavian’s secret agitators to him; if they would not help him, he would find them himself. He ended, nonetheless, by offering each soldier present a small donative, or bonus, of four hundred sesterces.
The soldiers laughed at this cheapskating, and when he lost his temper they became rowdy and began to disperse. This was looking like mutiny, so Antony obtained from his officers the names of those soldiers who were known for being disruptive, and had some of them (chosen by lot) beaten to death in his and Fulvia’s presence. It was said that blood was spattered on his wife’s face. “You will learn to obey orders,” he told the rest.
Meanwhile, in the consul’s absence, Octavian set off to Campania to visit new colonies of Julius Caesar’s veterans (a colony was a settlement specially founded to house demobilized soldiers), as well as two legions, the VII and the VIII. Ostensibly he was going to sell some of his father’s property, but his real purpose (which he kept even from his mother, lest she try to stop him) was to raise a private army from the dead dictator’s loyal legionaries.
The attempt met with success. The legionaries and veterans at colonies near the city of Capua were faced with an offer they could not refuse: an immediate grant of two thousand sesterces to every soldier (more than twice his annual pay), with a promise of additional largesse later. This generosity compared well with Antony’s parsimony. Soon an army of more than three thousand men had been mustered.