Augustus

At the end of December, the Triumvirate came to an end. Octavian’s purpose now was to maintain his new public image as a strict observer of the constitution. He had no governmental status of any kind and in theory was taking a very dangerous risk by politically disarming himself this way. However, after more than ten years at the head of affairs he had built up a formidable auctoritas, the power that came from his record and his proven ability. Furthermore, by now he was the master of a multitudinous clientela; many thousands of people had obligations to him. Perhaps most important of all, the legions in the west remained his to command. Tactfully, he withdrew from Rome to await events.

In January 32, two new consuls took office. In the days when the triumviral machine was still more or less in working order, consuls had been named for years ahead, drawn on a roughly equal basis from supporters of the two triumvirs. It so happened that those for the new year were partisans of Antony.

The senior consul was Gnaeus Domitius Ahenobarbus (the cognomen means “Bronze Beard”), the aristocrat who had proved to be a good admiral for Brutus and Cassius. His colleague was the able and determined Gaius Sosius, a new man. As was typical of the time, he was a provincial, perhaps from Picenum in northern Italy.

The consuls had an important commission from Antony to execute. Late in the previous autumn, the triumvir had sent them a letter which they were to read out to the Senate once they had taken office. His aim was to set out his case fully, authoritatively, and persuasively; he probably restated his eastern settlement, his various acta, and in particular his welcome Armenian victory.

However, the consuls made a curious decision, as Dio writes: “Domitius and Sosius…being extremely devoted to [Antony], refused to publish [the dispatch] to all the people, even though Caesar urged it on them.” This can only mean that in the consuls’ view its impact on public, or at least senatorial, opinion would be the opposite of that intended by its author. The problem must have lain with a proud, or at least a complacent, description of the Donations of Alexandria. Antony would have been unaware that Octavian’s anti-Cleopatra propaganda had been all too effective and that his references to the Donations would merely add fuel to the flames.

On February 1, Sosius went on the attack. He strongly defended Antony and proposed a motion of censure of Octavian. His message will have been that, if there was a threat to peace, it did not come from Antony, who had shown no sign whatever of aggression toward his colleague.

Although a tribune friendly to Octavian entered a timely veto, Sosius’ intervention flushed Octavian out. In mid-February he gathered around him supporters and Caesarian veterans, and returned at their head to Rome. This was, in effect, his Rubicon, for he was staging something very like a coup d’état. On his own initiative, he convened a meeting of the Senate. He had absolutely no right to do this, but the consuls and the senators turned up at the session. He must have wondered whether he was riding events or they were riding him. Dio reports that he surrounded “himself with a bodyguard of soldiers and friends who carried concealed daggers. Sitting between the Consuls in his chair of state, he spoke at length and in moderate terms in his own defence, and brought many accusations against Sosius and Antony.”

For the consuls, this triumph of force could not be allowed to stand. “As they did not dare to reply to [Octavian] and could not bear to be silent,” in Dio’s sharp words, they secretly left Rome and set sail for the east. They were accompanied by between three and four hundred of Rome’s one thousand senators—republicans or supporters of Antony.

On the limited evidence available it is hard to be sure whether or not this move was a defeat for Octavian. Unlike the former triumvir, the consuls could claim legitimate political authority and, although the senators who joined them were a minority of the total membership, they were a substantial number of the ruling elite. What is more, it was uncertain how many of those who stayed behind were fully signed-up supporters of Octavian. Seasoned observers of the political scene will have seen a comparison with the flight from Rome in 49 of Pompey the Great and most of the Senate when Julius Caesar invaded Italy and launched the first of the civil wars. Ahenobarbus and Sosius could argue that they were taking “Rome” with them.

It looks as if Octavian was taken aback when he learned what had happened. He needed to neutralize the rebuff; pretending it was what he had always had in mind, he claimed that he had sent the senators away voluntarily. Anyone else who wanted to leave had his full permission to do so.