Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire

Nonetheless, to create and maintain influence via information spread to the Russian compatriots, their Russian-language skills and those of other citizens of the former Soviet republics need to be maintained. Putin argued that “preserving a Russian-speaking territory” was “one of the priority issues” to be achieved via the compatriots.¹⁰¹ Accordingly, after its approval in December 2015, in 2006 the “Russian Language Federal Target Program 2006–2010” was launched. In 2011 it was updated to cover 2011–15. The purpose of the language program is twofold: first, it supports “the Russian language as the basis for the development of integration processes in the Commonwealth of Independent States”; second, it addresses “the language and cultural needs of compatriots living abroad.”¹⁰² The means to achieve these targets include organizing research and teaching, educational and cultural events, and provision of educational materials on Russian language, literature and culture, as well as remote Russian language teaching. On the other hand, the actual funds dedicated to these programs were minimal. In 2011–15, Russia devoted some $28 million (1.5 billion rubles) to the program of which 46 percent was invested to meet the “Satisfaction of Linguistic and Cultural Demands of Compatriots Abroad.”¹⁰³ In contrast, the German Goethe-Institut has an approximate annual budget of $320 million, of which 40 percent goes to language education.¹⁰⁴ This suggests that despite the rhetoric, Russia is not prepared to spend for purely cultural and linguistic support of the compatriots.

In March 2007, the softer and more humanitarian aspects of Russian foreign policy were conceptualized further in the “Russian Federation’s Foreign Policy Review.” It had been nearly a decade since compatriots were introduced into Russian foreign policy with the Foreign Policy Concept of 2000. The new review officially introduced the concept of the “humanitarian trend” of Russian foreign policy. Besides the defense of human rights, this included the protection of compatriots living abroad. The review was notable for several reasons. First, compatriots were conceptualized as important contributors to the formation of Russia’s “objective image” abroad.¹⁰⁵ Second, to implement the “humanitarian trend” the review relied closely on “soft power” tools, which it noted were effective in producing favorable outcomes for the world’s great powers.¹⁰⁶ However, Russia soon used compatriots for its military and territorial aims in the war with Georgia.

Just months before the start of war, Dmitry Medvedev was sworn in as president of Russia, a post he would hold until 2012, under the watchful eye and domineering hand of Prime Minister Putin. At just forty-two years of age, the former lecturer in civil and Roman law appeared to be a more youthful, liberal, and modern alternative to Putin. Yet, he lacked Putin’s strongman persona and eventually came to be regarded as little more than the prime minister’s shadow. Meanwhile, the summer of 2008 was a victorious one for the Medvedev-Putin duo. The so-called Five-Day War, the Russian invasion of Georgia, came and went. The world worried; the world grumbled; but the world also quickly forgot. Nonetheless, Russia clearly won this war, not only on the battlefield but in its permanent separation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia from Georgia. It was also a victory for Russia’s long-term strategy vis-à-vis its compatriots. As will be seen in Chapter 4, the Russian speakers and Russian citizens of South Ossetia and Abkhazia had become willing beneficiaries of Russia’s passports and thus its protection. Before Russian troops entered Georgia, Medvedev stated that “under the constitution and federal law… I must protect the life and dignity of Russian citizens wherever they are.”¹⁰⁷ Later Medvedev repeated the same pretext vis-à-vis the South Ossetians, stating that “protecting the lives and dignity of our citizens, wherever they may be, is an unquestionable priority for our country”¹⁰⁸ and “this is one of our foreign policy priorities.”¹⁰⁹ Certainly Georgia’s first military move against the separatist territories made Russia’s call for protection of its citizens and compatriots seemingly more legitimate.

Subsequently, flushed with success in Georgia, in September 2008 Medvedev founded the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation. This autonomous agency under the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, headed by member of the Federation Council of the Russian Federal Assembly Konstantin Kosachyov, is responsible for supporting and developing relations between Russia and the CIS as well as other countries, including guiding compatriot issues.¹¹⁰