Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire

Shortly after the annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and at the start of conflict in eastern Ukraine in the beginning of April 2014, the Duma approved a bill to simplify the procedure for Russian-speaking foreigners to obtain Russian citizenship. The need to develop simplified procedures for granting citizenship was already clearly expressed at the end of 2012 by Putin when he stated in a public address that “Russia needs new blood,”¹²⁶ and that the process of obtaining citizenship was too complicated. Amendments to Article 14 of the “Federal Law on Citizenship in the Russian Federation” specified that the new procedure for obtaining Russian citizenship could be used by foreign citizens and stateless persons recognized as native Russian speakers, for example, speaking fluent Russian and regularly using it at home, in social, cultural, and other spheres, and whose lineal ancestors permanently lived on territories of the Russian Empire or the USSR, on the condition that they renounce their present foreign citizenship. Also, according to the amendment, a native Russian speaker would be determined via an interview with a special commission.¹²⁷ The condition that new Russian citizens renounce their foreign passports marks a departure from Russia’s previous policy of seeking to spread dual citizenship across the post-Soviet states. It can be interpreted as a means to demarcate more clearly the allegiances of compatriots. Leaving no ambiguity about their citizenship would be more favorable to Russia’s efforts at protecting them and possibly seeking to acquire territories where they reside.

In many ways the development of Russian compatriot policies follows the arc of Russia’s power, ambition, and struggle for national identity. In the two decades between 1994 and 2015, the Russian government promulgated more than twenty policies, programs, and laws to both conceptualize and assist compatriots. These were an ever-present dilemma and opportunity for Moscow; however, the manner in which Moscow chose to engage or at times ignore the 30 million Russians and Russian speakers varied over these two decades. In the early 1990s, as Russia grappled with severe economic decline and new statehood, the compatriot issue remained vague and ill defined. Early on Moscow decided that the diaspora would not be invited to return to Russia and stipulations were made to block mass repatriation. Only fifteen years later, some half-hearted attempts at resettlement followed. Nonetheless, even in the Yeltsin era there were efforts to link issues of foreign policy and compatriots as in the cases of the Baltic States and the failed efforts to introduce dual citizenship across the post-Soviet states.

Since the 2000s under Putin’s leadership, as the Russian economy and stature on the world stage grew along with rising oil prices, the compatriot issue increasingly came into focus. Russia redefined itself as a great power on the world stage and a leader of a Slavic, Russian-speaking, Orthodox Christian civilization—in other words, of the Russian World. Russians, Russian speakers, and other minorities in the near abroad were the crucial part of this world and were politicized and conceptualized as compatriots. Many early compatriot policies appeared like confused and heavy-handed attempts to use soft power. Under Putin, the compatriots were increasingly conceptualized as a resource for Russian foreign policy and geopolitical ambition in the near abroad. After the Georgian war of 2008 over compatriots, Russian policies became more clear and focused on protecting citizens and compatriots abroad.

This chapter has also demonstrated that Russian compatriot policies cannot be viewed in isolation. Compatriots are not only part of Russian humanitarian outreach programs, but rather are enshrined in Russia’s national laws and linguistic, cultural, and information programs. Furthermore, compatriots are part of the basic foundations of the Russian state: in national security strategies, foreign policy concepts, and definitions of citizenship. Finally, compatriot policies should not be viewed as a reflection of certain times or leaderships. Just as Yeltsin inherited the compatriot issue from the debris of the Soviet Union’s dissolution and Stalin’s ethnic policies, so too will the compatriot issue persist long after Putin retires from power. Russian compatriots will remain relevant to Europe and Eurasia in the decades to come, regardless of the leadership in the Kremlin. As I argued in the previous chapter, Russian compatriots serve a key role in the reimperialization trajectory, which aims to maintain neo-imperial influence over and regain territory in the former Soviet republics. The following four case study chapters will demonstrate how and to what extent these compatriot policies and the reimperialization trajectory have been enacted in Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, the Baltic States, and Central Asia, as well as Belarus and Armenia.