Blowback, Second Edition: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire

The real economic model for mainland China, although never mentioned for all the obvious reasons, is undoubtedly neither Japan nor South Korea but Taiwan, where the state and the ruling Nationalist Party own outright or directly control about 50 percent of all corporate assets and account for close to 30 percent of Taiwan’s gross national product. Numerous and successful state-owned enterprises are the single most striking feature of Taiwan’s economic landscape. Even though one of the richest places on earth, largely untouched by the economic meltdown of the late 1990s, it is structurally less orthodox in terms of the American model of capitalism than any other East Asian country.⁸

But Taiwan is not just a covert economic model for China; it is also one of China’s greatest political conundrums. Although an unquestioned part of China according to international law, the island has become so rich that many of its inhabitants would far rather see their country secede and become independent than find themselves integrated into the poorer, more politically repressive mainland. If Taiwan did declare its independence, any number of dreadful developments could follow, ranging from a nationalistic backlash in China that could lead to the overthrow of the regime to an attempted invasion of Taiwan to keep China’s territory intact and a possible larger war involving the United States. The Taiwan problem at the end of the twentieth century is, as it was at the midpoint of the century, still the single most complicated issue of Chinese foreign policy and the most dangerous place where Chinese and American interests intersect. If it is mishandled by either side, the various kinds of blowback that might result could dominate global politics in the next century.

CHINA: FOREIGN POLICY,

HUMAN RIGHTS, AND TRADE

In addition to its desire to maintain national security, advance its economic interests, and repress dissidents, China’s ruling Communist Party emphatically plays upon the country’s experience as a victim of imperialism and on its newfound nationalism. In its foreign policy, its primary focus has not been on expanding its territory or influence at the expense of other nations but on settling old, irredentist claims. The term “irredentism” derives from the name of an Italian political party of 1878 that sought to recover adjacent regions inhabited largely by Italians but under foreign control; by extension it now refers to any policy aimed at recovering territories lost to foreigners.

In the Chinese context irredentism applies to places formerly claimed by Imperial China, whose last dynasty ended in 1912, and allegedly lost due to foreign activity. Without regard to their relative importance, the primary ones in question have long been 1) Hong Kong, 2) Taiwan, 3) various island groups in the South China Sea, and 4) Tibet. The issues surrounding these contested areas have varied depending on whether each was occupied by China or others, on the nature of the historical record that lay behind each claim, and on the relative power of the claim holders. In addition, there is the question, seldom directly raised by the Chinese but to one degree or another taken into consideration, of the costs today of pursuing old claims, no matter how well founded. Each of the remaining claims—the Hong Kong one having been peaceably settled in 1997—is much exacerbated by the regime’s increasing reliance on nationalism to solidify a base of support for its rule. The need to invoke the inviolable nature of “the Chinese motherland” as a basis for power has spurred the government to right old wrongs even when doing so violates another nation’s sovereignty or tramples on the human rights of peoples who were never in any sense part of the Chinese empire. This is only complicated by China’s stated willingness to use military means to achieve its irredentist aims.